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In this dissertation, we have analyzed various security and trustworthy solutions 
for modern computing systems and proposed a framework that will provide holistic 
security and trust for the entire lifecycle of a virtualized workload. The framework consists 
of 3 novel techniques and a set of guidelines. These 3 techniques provide necessary 
elements for secure and trusted execution environment while the guidelines ensure that 
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We have successfully implemented and demonstrated that the framework provides 
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during an update of the virtualized workload. Given the proliferation of virtualization 
from cloud servers to embedded systems, techniques presented in this dissertation can be 
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Computers have become an integral part of our daily lives. Computers are used in
every aspect [84] of our lives from the morning alarm to bed time book reading. While some
of the ways in which we use computers may seem mundane (for e.g., watching movies, playing
music, instant messaging), other uses can have far reaching implications. For instance, we
depend on computers for our banking needs; from receiving our wages to making purchases.
Some other critical uses for computer applications can be found in the areas of aircraft flight
control, weapons, nuclear systems [77] and delivering critical care medicine [49].
As our dependence on these computing systems continues to increase, so does the
quantity and sensitivity of information stored and processed by them. This information
includes confidential personal data like secret passwords, credit card numbers, and bank
account numbers. As computing systems store and process increasing amounts of personal
and sensitive data, they become lucrative target for malicious entities.
Even though we greatly rely on these computing systems for our daily needs and
entrust them with our personal and sensitive information, the current state of their security
and trustworthiness is not very reassuring. Pandalabs Annual Report [40] estimates there
were a total of about 75 million samples or 285,000 samples of malware per day created in the
year 2017 alone and this trend has been rapidly increasing in the recent years. Ransomware
attacks like WannaCry, Petya, and NotPetya [16, 15, 14] have caused significant monetary
losses and business disruption for individuals, governments, and businesses alike. These type
of attacks have become so severe that the Ransomware 2017 [47] report by Symantec high-
lights how the ransomware is evolving in complexity similar to cyber espionage.
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In recent years, high profile data breaches have become very common. It seems as if
we are hearing about a major data breach as frequently as once every month. These data
breaches have far reaching impacts as they compromise the identity and security of thou-
sands and millions of users. In 2013, Yahoo Inc., has suffered the biggest data breach [17] in
history. Around 3 billion user accounts have been compromised and 350 million dollars of
losses were publicly disclosed. Later in 2016, an online dating website, Adult Friend Finder
was breached and over four hundred million user accounts have been compromised [114]. In
this attack, personal, confidential and potentially embarassing details about the customers
have been made public. Further, in 2017, Equifax has faced one of the most critical security
breaches [115]. This breach has result in the leakage of extremely sensitive and identity infor-
mation of the customers. This included social security numbers, birth dates, and addresses
of 147 million users.
For most, if not all software products, security is an after thought. This attitude along
with the fact that there is no easy way to formally specify and evaluate software, makes them
prone to many security vulnerabilities. The National Vulnerabilities Database [7] lists almost
hundred thousand vulnerabilities with over twelve thousand discovered in 2017 alone. Not
only are there more vulnerabilities being discovered than ever, they are also increasing in
their severity level [13]. The presence of such vulnerabilities will only multiply the threats
posed by malicious programs and actors.
With increasing malware attacks, data breaches, and vulnerabilities the outlook for
the trust and security in computers is very bleak. Without proper security controls in
place, the data can be stolen, modified, and held as a hostage for ransom. Thus computer
security and trustworthiness has now become ever more important to avoid these systems
from leaking out this critical information to unauthorized entities and enable smooth and
seamless interaction with the technology solutions enabled by the computers.
1.2. A Vision for Trusted and Secure Computing Systems
In general, computer security aims at providing confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity [120] with computing systems. Confidentiality is breached when information is accessible
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to an unwanted and unauthorized entity. This entity can be a human, a software program
or another computing system. The integrity is infringed when information is modified by
an unauthorized entity and the availability is disrupted when a malicious entity succeeds
in overloading the computing system with illegitimate requests. Availability may also be
affected due to system failures or errors that are unrelated to security attacks.
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [163] defines that a computing platform is trust-
worthy if it behaves as expected. To achieve this, they have proposed hardware and software
based mechanisms. Using these mechanisms it is possible to attest the trustworthiness of a
computing system to certain degree.
Many of the computer security and trust solutions try to address these challenges
individually. While trust and security are orthogonal to each other, it is important to have
a holistic view and approach for a computing system’s security and trustworthiness. For
example, a security solution is not very reliable if it is not trustworthy. In this dissertation
we analyze various security and trustworthy solutions for modern computing systems. We
then present our proposed framework that will provide holistic security and trust for the
entire life cycle of an application.
1.3. Methodology
To provide holistic trust and security for a computing system, we have designed
three novel techniques. These techniques have been developed and tested in virtualized
environments providing trust and security for virtualized workloads. A virtualized workload
is any independent unit of software executing on top of virtualized infrastructure.
This can be a full stack workload which includes an application, necessary libraries,
and an operating system. Or it can be a lean stack workload which includes an appli-
cation and optional libraries without an operating system. Since the workload can mean
an application as well, we use the terms application and workload synonymously wherever
applicable.
Given the proliferation of virtualization from cloud servers to embedded systems[126,
98, 122, 119], techniques presented in this dissertation, can be implemented on most comput-
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ing systems. By using these three techniques, we will be able to provide trust and security
in 3 phases of the application life cycle. These three phases represent the entire lifecycle of
any application or workload in a virtualized environment. These phases are generic and can
be applicable to regular applications as well. The three phases are:
(1) At the time of launch
(2) Any time during the execution
(3) After a change or update
In this dissertation, we investigate different trust and security requirements in these
three stages and provide a comprehensive framework that allows secure and trusted exe-
cution of the workload throughout its lifecycle. Further, this dissertation focuses only on
confidentiality and integrity of the virtualized workload. We consider that availability of the
computing system is out of the scope of this dissertation.
1.3.1. Secure Execution
The most important security feature necessary for a computing system is secure ex-
ecution. This feature will allow a computer program to execute with its integrity or con-
fidentiality uncompromised. Without security guarantees, it is pointless to prove that a
computing system is trustworthy. Hence we will first focus on how to create secure execu-
tion environment for virtualized workloads and then focus on how to provide trust in this
securely executing workloads.
There are software and hardware approaches to provide secure execution environment
and guarantee the secure execution of a computer program. While the hardware approaches
usually come with more guarantees, they are very difficult to build, test, and manufacture at
necessary volumes. By the time a hardware architecture is designed, thoroughly tested, and
released into the market, it is usually outdated to the latest requirements. These challenges
make hardware approaches difficult to embrace in the real world outside of the academia
and research communities.
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Traditionally, operating systems are responsible for providing a secure execution en-
vironment. With millions of lines of code, the operating systems are potentially vulnerable
to many attacks and are hardly trustworthy. To provide an effective and trustworthy se-
cure execution environment, the provider of the secure execution environment needs to have
smaller Trusted Computing Base (TCB), should be resilient to powerful attacks (e.g. attacks
launched from the operating system context), and allow fine grain controls of what objects
can be secured.
In Chapter 3, we present a virtualization based secure execution solution that fulfills
the above requirements:
(1) Secure execution is provided by hypervisors which have few thousands of lines of
code (smaller TCB) and are naturally less vulnerable and more trustworthy.
(2) Is resilient against attacks launched by powerful adversary, such as a compromised
and/or malicious Operating System (type 1 hypervisors execute at a higher privilege
level).
(3) Allows page level granularity in providing security to the necessary components of
the secure process.
1.3.2. Trust and Integrity Measurement
It wouldn’t be just enough to ensure that a computing system is executing securely.
Like aforementioned, we need to provide guarantees that a securely executing system should
also be trustworthy. A system will be trustworthy when we have verifiable proof that it is
executing code that we ’know’ or ’trust’ to be secure. It is important to understand that
we are only focusing on providing trust guarantees to a system to ensure that we are indeed
executing what we know or trust to be good/benign/secure. Such a trust guarantee is usually
provided as hash measurements which would indicate the state of the computing system.
To provide trustworthiness in a computing system, we have to ensure that an appli-
cation is launched in a trusted state. In other words, the application is in a state we trust
to be good/benign. To provide such a guarantee, we will have to make sure every software
component that is launched prior the application of interest is also trusted. This will guar-
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antee that the application is indeed launched in a trusted environment. To provide such
a guarantee, we can use the chain-of-trust as demonstrated in SRTM [36] and DRTM [66].
Both these methods start with a hardware based chip [123] as root-of-trust that cannot be
modified or tampered with.
After ensuring that the application is launched in a trusted state, there will be many
hardware and software components interacting with the application. It is possible to ensure
that these interactions may alter the state of the system and render our initial trust in the
system invalid. This would raise questions about the trustworthiness of the system at any
point after the launch. How can we guarantee that the system is executing in trusted state at
any time after the launch? Would such guarantees be trustworthy without the chain-of-trust?
Can these guarantees be trustworthily reported to a remote or local verifier?
To address these questions, Chapter 4 presents the Radium architecture [80]. By
extending the hardware root-of-trust to the hypervisor, Radium facilitates asynchronous,
on-demand integrity measurements that are more flexible and granular.
1.3.3. Vulnerability Management
While we provide a secure execution environment and on-demand integrity measure-
ments to ensure that a system is running in a secure and trusted state, we should be vigilant
of potential bugs and vulnerabilities in the system. As discussed earlier, there is no easy
way to specify and verify a software. To tackle this problem is out of the scope for this
dissertation. Instead, we provide a system to analyze and manage the vulnerabilities or
defects in the system to ensure that the system is free from any known vulnerability and
thus continues to be in a secure state.
As modern systems have become complex with multi-million lines of code along with
hundreds and thousands of dependencies, it is a huge challenge to manage vulnerabilities.
Especially when these systems are linked with many libraries, dependencies, and other sys-
tems. To exacerbate this increased complexity in the systems, vulnerabilities have been
rising in both number and severity. To tackle this challenge effectively, we have to organize
and manage vulnerabilities in an efficient way. We should also be able to provide a way to
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search, analyze, and query these vulnerabilities in a natural and intuitive way.
To tackle these challenges, in Chapter 5 we present an Ontology based Vulnerability
Database (OVDB) [79] and a Vulnerability Assessment Framework for Cloud Computing [72]
based on OVDB. Ontologies [51] are used for sharing knowledge and can model real world
concepts, such as vulnerabilities, which cannot be efficiently organized as taxonomies. With
their roots in knowledge modeling and artificial intelligence, ontologies also make it easier
to semantically reason and analyze the vulnerabilities.
1.4. Summary
During the course of investigating principles to design a holistic trusted and secure
computing system to ensure confidentiality and integrity throughout various stages of an
application’s lifecycle, this dissertation makes the following contributions:
(1) A novel technique to securely execute an application even in the presence of mali-
cious operating system using hardware virtualization.
(2) A new integrity measurement architecture that extends the hardware root-of-trust
to the hypervisor to facilitate on-demand measurements that are more flexible and
resilient to TOCTTOU attacks.
(3) A comprehensive framework for organizing, managing, and assessing vulnerabilities
in complex computing systems such as cloud using ontologies.
(4) A set of guidelines that can be used to design and build a secure computing system




Instead of starting from scratch, the solution presented in this dissertation builds
on top of many existing technologies and solutions. To understand the design decisions and
effectiveness of the presented framework, it is important to have insight into the technologies
we rely upon. In this chapter, we will discuss technologies that have laid the foundation
for our solution. We will also highlight the limitations with these technologies that have
motivated us to design our solution. These discussions have been organized thematically as
follows:
Section 2.1, discusses some of the hardware based architectures designed to provide
secure execution for applications. We will discuss how the knowledge of these architectures
provide us the key features necessary to build secure execution environments. Later, in
Section 2.2, we will discuss the advancements in virtualization technology and how it presents
a solid foundation to build modern day security and trusted computing solutions. In Section
2.3, we will introduce trusted computing and discuss how the modern day trusted computing
solutions can be built without any expensive hardware and significant modifications to the
commodity hardware. Finally, in Section 2.5 we will present some approaches to vulnerability
assessment.
2.1. Hardware Security Architectures
Hardware security architectures typically consist of modified hardware components
and/or configurations to provide security to the application. These hardware based security
solutions differ quite a bit in their approaches in what hardware components need to be
modified. Similarly, they also differ in what software should be part of the trusted computing
base. Some architectures include Operating System as a part of the trusted computing base
while some architectures exclude the Operating System from the trusted computing base.
Unlike software, which is dynamic in nature, hardware will not alter its state or func-
tion. This property of the hardware in general makes it ideal choice for tamper resistant
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solutions. Thus, hardware security architectures are usually geared to provide solutions
where confidentiality and integrity are critical, for example, to provide Digital Rights Man-
agement (DRM).
Solutions such as Citadel [153] and ABYSS [152] provide a physically tamper-resistant
package with the entire processing subsystem encapsulated within this package. Such a
subsystem usually contains FLASH ROM, CPU, DRAM, and BBRAM [111]. This subsytem
is responsible for executing the security sensitive portions of the application. These solutions,
along with Dyad [160] execute only signed code from trusted entities. The trusted hardware
contains the private key of a public and private key pair which is used to authenticate
applications to remote verifier.
Although AEGIS [128] architecture has goals and functionality similar to the above
secure co-processor solutions, it uses a design similar to XOM [159]. Both these solutions
execute secure applications in an isolated secure compartment which cannot be accessed or
interfered by regular applications. This is achieved by encrypting data and instructions of
the secure applications and the decryption key is protected by the hardware. The secure
applications are decrypted only in the secure compartment. While XOM requires all in-
structions in the secure compartment to be encrypted, AEGIS uses encryption and integrity
verification whenever required.
Another security architecture HIDE [162] encrypts cache entries to obfuscate memory
access patterns so that it is impossible for an attacker to identify the Control Flow Graph
(CFG) and by extension software libraries used in the application. When such a control
flow graph is identified for well known open source libraries used in the secure application,
they can be exploited to compromise the security of the application. In Arc3D [56] it was
shown that operating systems cannot be trusted to provide necessary security guarantees for
the applications with DRM requirements. Further, it was recommended that the underlying
architecture should be providing these security guarantees to the applications.
Similar features are also provided by the IBM 4758 [124] cryptographic coprocessor
based solutions. In this architecture, the system contains a regular microcomputer processor
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(Intel 486), a special chip for cryptographic operations, and memory subsytem in a tamper
resistant secure package. By using a BBRAM, the package can actively respond to any
physical attacks to tamper the trust and security of the system. When any such attacks are
detected, all the sensitive information is deleted and the device will be permanently disabled
ensuring the confidentiality of the sensitive information.
From the above discussion in hardware security architectures, we can summarize the
following observations: Hardware provides a tamper resistant root-of-trust to build solutions
on top of. Only security sensitive portions of the application need to be protected and
operating systems are not trustworthy to provide these security guarantees.
2.2. Virtualization
In Computer Science, virtualization refers to abstraction or emulation of hardware
in the software layer. In this dissertation, we refer to virtualization with respect to the
emulation and/or simulation of hardware machine as described by Goldberg [55]. Such a
simulated machine is called as Virtual Machine and the software doing the simulation is called
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) or Hypervisor [118]. Virtual machines and virtualization
have gained lot of mainstream adoption in the recent years due to their benefits in resource
consolidation and efficiency. Cloud Computing [75, 95] has been the biggest proponent of
this widespread adoption of virtualization.
As discussed in the previous Section 2.1, hardware security architectures are mod-
ifications to the hardware to provide superior trust and security to the applications. As
virtualization simulates the hardware components, it provides a more flexible platform to
implement security architectures. In the Framework for Design Validation of Security Archi-
tectures, Dwoskin et al. [48] shows that hardware security architectures can be implemented
in the virtualization layer.
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) and Hypervisor are used interchangeably while Vir-
tual Machine (VM) can also be referred to as guest, domain, and partition. Hypervisors may
have their own device drivers to allocate and control the hardware resources. Alternatively,
they can rely on other operating systems to provide divers for the hardware resources. De-
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pending on how the hypervisor interacts with the underlying hardware, the hypervisors are
typically classified into two types [44]:
(1) Bare Metal
A Type 1 hypervisor or a bare metal hypervisor executes directly on the hardware
and is typically loaded first in to the memory by the bootloader. A popular example
for this type of hypervisor is Xen [26]. A type 1 hypervisor may use one of the
virtual machines a privileged guest and uses it to access the hardware resources. In
Xen hypervisor, such a privileged guest is referred to as Domain Zero (Dom0). In
contrast, VMware [117] and KVM [58] have a monolithic architecture that bundles
the device drivers along with the hypervisor.
A virtualization aware guest is often referred to as ParaVirtual (PV) machine and
contains drivers that communicate with virtualized hardware rather than the phys-
ical hardware. A guest unaware of it being virtualized is referred to as Hardware[-
assisted] Virtual Machine (HVM) and often consists of unmodified Operating System
executing on top of it. In this dissertation, we focus on the type 1 hypervisors as
they have complete control over the physical hardware resources and more suitable
for implementing security architectures.
(2) Hosted
A Type 2 hypervisor or a hosted hypervisor is executed by the Operating System as
an application and relies on the host Operating System’ drivers for hardware access.
It is important to understand that the type 2 hypervisor do not have absolute
control over the entire physical machine’s hardware. Rather, type 2 hypervisor
only has control over the resources allocated to it by the host operating system.
However, the type 2 hypervisor can exercise complete control over the resources
allocated by it to the guest virtual machines. VirtualBox [150] is a good example
of type 2 hypervisors. In functionality, type 2 hypervisors are much similar to the
programming language virtual machines such as JVM [97, 141].
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2.2.1. Hardware Support for Virtualization
With the increase in the adoption of virtualization technology, hardware vendors
started implementing support for virtualization [138] within the hardware. These are com-
monly referred to as Virtualization extensions. We will discuss the 2 major platforms and
their support for virtualization.
(1) Intel
Intel has introduced hardware support for CPU virtualization (commonly referred to
as Intel VT-x) that provides instructions to switch the processor operation between
VMX root mode (where the hypervisor gets control) and VMX non-root mode [136,
104]. This support allows the processor to reduce the number of instructions that
need to get trapped while improving performance and complexity of the VMM
code base. Intel has also support for memory virtualization through Extended Page
Tables (EPT) which allow additional indirection for the VM physical addresses. This
improves the performance of in-guest memory lookups and accesses by not involving
the hypervisor. Finally, through I/O device virtualization (commonly referred to as
Intel VT-d) it becomes trivial for multiple virtual machines to share I/O devices in
a secure and efficient manner [54].
(2) AMD
Similar to Intel, AMD also support CPU, memory, and I/O virtualization. The
AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) [138, 19] technology provides the ability to
selectively trap sensitive instructions and use a Virtual Machine Control Structures
(VMCS) to schedule virtual machines as processes by the VMM kernel. With the
use of Nested Page Tables (NPT) [46], AMD allows the virtual machine’s operating
system to allocate and control its own memory. A VM can also request for dynam-
ically increasing and decreasing the memory allocated to it by the VMM. With the
introduction of I/O Memory Management Unit (IOMMU), AMD has support for
I/O device virtualization [23] and provides the guest OS to manage its own I/O
device interactions. Alternatively, there can be a dedicated driver domain that acts
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as a proxy for all virtual machines’ access to the I/O devices [146].
To summarize, modern hardware virtualization technology can provide an efficient and secure
abstraction of the underlying hardware devices to the VMM. This also gives great control
over the hardware resource allocation and allows the VMM layer to decide which instructions
need to get trapped into the VMM layer. This allows the VMM code to be simple and efficient
while giving us the ability to modify and control any hardware behavior exposed to the virtual
machine by the hypervisor. As the hypervisor runs at a higher privilege level than the guest
operating system, we have hardware enforced protections for the VMM. Leveraging these
features, secure [hardware] architectures can be implemented in the virtualization layer.
2.3. Trusted Computing
For the purpose of this dissertation, we define trusted computing as “A computer
system for which an entity has some level of assurance that(part of or all of) the computer
system is behaving as expected” [99]. The nature of this entity and the degree of the
assurance can vary greatly from system to system and component to component.
To facilitate trusted computing in modern computers, Trusted Computing Group
(TCG), a consortium of computing companies, has designed the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) that provides a secure root-of-trust to store and report the system measurements [100,
154, 129]. TPM provides attestation service, storage service and endorsement service for the
platform. Programs that use cryptography keys to secure user data can use TPM to build
more trustworthy applications as hardware based cryptography is immune to lot of software
based attacks. TPM is a generic solution with platform specific implementations. In this
dissertation, we limit our discussion to the PC platform specific implementation of TPM
commonly found in desktops, laptops, and servers.
TPM consists of Platform Configuration Registers (PCR). A PCR is a 160-bit register
with special properties. The values stored in PCRs can be used to verify the measurements.
The PCR values are used to define the state of the system. Various software components
running on the system are measured and these measurements are stored in the PCRs. A
single PCR or a set of PCR values is used to represent the state of the platform. By extending
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PCRs with the measurements of various components in the system, the state of the platform
can be recorded. This recorded state of the platform can later be used to verify if the system
is in a trusted state.
In PC Platform there are a total of 24 (0 . . . 23) PCR registers in TPM (version 1.2).
PCRs 0–4 store measurements related to BIOS, ROM, and Memory Block Register. PCRs
5–7 store measurements related to OS loaders. PCRs 8–15 are known as static PCRs that
store measurements related to OS. These are typically used to record and verify the state of
the system during the boot time. PCRs 17–22 are known as dynamic PCRs and are used to
store measurements of the system dynamically. These are used either at the boot time or at
any other time as necessary. Some trusted computing solutions such as SRTM and DRTM
use these PCRs for verifying the platform state at boot time and at a dynamic reset.
The TPM has several cryptographic keys and keypairs. These keypairs, along with
the PCRs, are used to perform operations to store, measure and verify the system state.
TPM uses the following special operations [123] that makes the storage, measurement, and
verification tamper resistant.
2.3.1. Extend Operation
PCR is designed in such a way that the only write operation it supports is Extend.
In other words, a PCR can not be assigned a specific value using the write operation. This
makes the PCR non-commutative and allows it to store infinite number of measurements.
After an entity is measured, to be stored in the PCR, it is hashed with the PCR’s existing
value. If a PCR has to be extended with a measurement value X, the following operation is
performed by the TPM.
PCRnew value = Hash(PCRexisting value||X)
2.3.2. Bind Operation
Using the TPM, we can bind any secret to the platform and save it to the TPM by
encrypting the secret with a storage key. This storage key is an asymmetric encryption key
and the secret is bound to the platform by encrypting the secret with the public part of the
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storage key. The private part of the storage key never leaves the TPM hence guaranteeing
that only the TPM which has access to the private key can decrypt the secret. Since these
storage keys are unique to each chip, we can be confident that a secret bound to a particular
TPM, can only be decrypted by that particular TPM.
2.3.3. Seal Operation
Sealing adds platform state to the binding operation. The value being stored is not
only associated to a particular TPM but is also associated with the values stored in the
PCRs. In other words, if a value is sealed with specific set of PCR values, it can only be
unsealed when that particular set of PCRs have the values expected at the time of sealing,
implying the platform is a known state.
2.3.4. Quote Operation
The TPM allows verification of the platform state through the Quote operation. A
verifier can request a quote of the platform state from the TPM. The TPM will issue a quote,
hash of set of the PCRs signed by the TPM’s AIK. The quote has the PCR values that will
attest the platform state. The quote operation is used to ensure the platform is in a trusted
state before running security critical applications or to verify that an application of interest
has executed as expected.
With its tamper resistant design, cryptographic keys, and secure operations TPM can
be used to build trustworthy systems using modern computers with little-to-no modification.
in fact, many modern computing systems come equipped with the TPM out of the box. It is
also important to note that the TPM functionality is designed to be generic for any platform
and is very inexpensive. This allows TPM to be integrated into any kind of device and can
be expected to be widely available. This makes the TPM an ideal root-of-trust to build a
trusted computing solution upon.
2.4. Cloud Computing
Cloud Computing [43, 103] is essentially a new information services delivery model
that has gotten widespread adoption in the recent years. It can be defined as a model for
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delivering computing services such as storage, computation power, network bandwidth, and
software across the Internet using virtualization [158, 88, 83]. This has been a significant
paradigm shift in how information services are delivered and has become the de-facto stan-
dard to deliver such services for end-users and enterprises alike. The delivery of the services
in Cloud Computing can be classified into 3 categories [94].
2.4.1. IaaS
In the Infrastructure as a Service (Iaas) [29] delivery model, hardware or infras-






The IaaS is the most fundamental offering of the Cloud Computing paradigm. This
service enables users to subscribe to the hardware resources whenever they want with much
finer granularity. It also prevents them in investing in the hardware that they may not use
to the full extent, or sometimes, not use at all due to change of plans. The IaaS also allows
the users to scale up or scale down their infrastructure with great flexibility and very little
overheads or delays. Some of the major IaaS offerings are: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft
Azure, Google Cloud, and Digital Ocean. An IaaS user is responsible for the security of
the hardware resources and anything that executes on top of it for e.g., operating systems,
application platforms, and applications.
2.4.2. PaaS
After the IaaS, Platform as a Service (PaaS) [109] is the most important offering.
Instead of the raw hardware resources, PaaS provides a ready-to-use platform for running
applications. This allows the developers to focus on developing and deploying the application
and not worry about the provisioning and administering the hardware resources. PaaS
16
offerings provide APIs to integrate into the user’s development process, load balancing, and
tools to scale the application dynamically. One key advantage of PaaS over the IaaS is that it
is more easier to use and has better interoperability for the user across cloud providers. Some
of the notable PaaS offerings are: Google App Engine, Heroku, CloudFoundry, AppScale. A
PaaS user will be responsible for the security of the application and the user data stored by
the application.
2.4.3. SaaS
Software as a Service (SaaS) [45] is probably the most popular model of delivering
cloud services. SaaS refers to an application provided as a service and billed through pay-as-
you-go model. Unlike the traditional product delivery model where the user buys a product
and owns it forever. SaaS model is very convenient model for offering new services as there is
no overhead on the end-user’s part other than signing up for the service. Some of the notable
SaaS applications are: Google Apps, Salesforce, Workday, Concur, and Cisco WebEx. A SaaS
user is responsible only about the security of their own account when trusting the security
of the application with the service provider.
While Cloud Computing makes delivering information services very convenient, it
also complicates the security challenges to the cloud providers and end users alike. Storing
data and executing applications in remote locations administered by the cloud provider
reduces visibility and control for the users. Cloud providers have to deal with unknown
code executing in their systems while protecting users from internal and external threats.
It is often complicated by various layers introduced by the cloud computing. This typically
includes: the hypervisor, operating system, platforms and/or libraries, applications, and
management interface. To tackle this challenge in Cloud Computing or any virtualized
environment, one would need a robust vulnerability management program.
2.5. Vulnerability Management
According to the ISO 27002 [68], a vulnerability is defined as “a weakness of an asset or
group of assets that can be exploited by one or more threats”. This weakness makes systems
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vulnerable to threats and compromises the security of the system. Vulnerability management
involves more than just scanning for vulnerabilities. It also involves risk evaluation, risk
acceptance, and remediation [110]. It is extremely important to have a robust vulnerability
management program to alleviate potential risks that arise due to the vulnerabilities.
NIST recommends [93] that every organization have a dedicated Patch and Vulner-
ability Management Group to monitor, evaluate, and remediate vulnerabilities within the
organization. NIST also provides several databases, tools, techniques, and processes for man-
aging security vulnerabilities [3, 7, 5, 2, 4, 60, 25]. Gartner lists vulnerability management as
one the most critical security measure [85] for Cloud Workloads. Despite vulnerability man-
agement being an important aspect of any organizations’ security arsenal, current practices
are not very promising.
With the accelerating adoption of cloud computing and rapidly changing IT land-
scape, vulnerability management becomes even more challenging. To properly address these
challenges, it is imperative to use standards based solutions. For this purpose, NIST rec-
ommends using Ontologies and even developed an Open Vulnerability and Assessment Lan-
guage [25] for security content and automation. By using ontologies, we can provide effective
vulnerability management and automation.
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CHAPTER 3
VIRTUALIZATION BASED SECURE EXECUTION1
To provide security and trust in a computing system, it should at least guarantee the
secure execution of the applications. This becomes even more critical in case of remote or
distributed computation. In this chapter we will introduce the challenge of secure execution,
historical approaches and limitations. We will then present our virtualization based secure
execution framework along with an implementation in the context of cloud computing.
3.1. Introduction
The recent years have seen a wide scale growth, adoption and popularity of the Virtu-
alization Technology [135] to provide efficient and cost-effective usage of expensive hardware.
Virtualization technology introduces a software abstraction layer or virtualization layer (vir-
tualization software) between the hardware and the operating system, thus decoupling them
from each other. This software abstraction layer is known as a Virtual Machine Monitor
(VMM) [121] or the hypervisor. A VMM / hypervisor allows the user to create multiple Vir-
tual Machines on a single physical hardware platform, each capable of running an operating
system (O.S.) and its applications. Virtualization provides security by isolating the guest
O.S and its applications in a single virtual machine. Thus any security failure in a particular
guest OS does not affect the functioning of other guest OSs running on the system.
A virtualization software emulates the underlying hardware platform to provide a
known interface for the OS and applications to work on. This makes it much easier to
incorporate hardware security mechanisms within the virtualization layer as compared to
on-chip. Moreover the performance overheads incurred by the virtualization softwares are
significantly low as observed by Younge et al. in [161]. Thus the security of the entire system
can be increased without accounting for significant performance overheads.
1Majority of this chapter has been previously published from S. Kotikela, S. Nimgaonkar, M. Gomath-
isankaran, International Association of Science and Technology for Development (2011). Reproduced with
permission from ACTA PRESS
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With this motivation, we propose a Virtualization Based Secure Execution and Test-
ing Framework by modifying an open source Virtualization Software - Xen [26]. Our frame-
work provides a generic interface to plug-in an existing secure architecture. Once plugged-in,
the attack suite in our framework performs a series of attacks on a secure application/process
running on the underlying secure architecture. A log of all these events is stored which can
be later reviewed to judge if the secure architecture behavior is secure or not.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 3.2 describes our Proposed
Framework. Section 3.3 presents the Implementation of our framework. Section 3.5 describes
the Related Work followed by the Future Work in Section 3.6 and Summary of contributions
in Section 3.7.
3.2. Proposed Framework
The proposed Virtualization Based Secure Execution and Testing Framework for test-
ing hardware secure architectures is developed on top of Xen Hypervisor [26], an open-source
Virtualization Software. Therefore our framework uses some of the components already pro-
vided by Xen. Figure 3.1 below shows all the components of the proposed architecture along
with their functioning. These components are Xen Hypervisor, MoCo VM, Application VM,
Event Trigger Mechanism, Secure Architecture Plug-in Interface (SAPI) and Attacker VM.
The MoCo VM in turn consists the Monitor and the Controller while the Application VM
consists the Secure Application running on top of the underlying Secure Architecture.
3.2.1. Xen Hypervisor/VMM
The Xen Hypervisor is the basic abstraction layer (virtualization layer) software that
sits directly on the hardware below the operating system. It emulates the underlying hard-
ware and is responsible for CPU scheduling and memory partitioning in order to allow
multiple Virtual Machines to run on single hardware platform. Xen Hypervisor controls
the execution of all the Virtual Machines running on it, however it has no knowledge of
networking, external storage devices, video, or any other common I/O functions found in a
computing system.
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Figure 3.1. Virtualization Based Secure Execution and Testing Framework
3.2.2. MoCo VM
A MoCo VM - Monitor/Controller Virtual Machine is essentially a specialized DOM
0 kernel found in the Xen architecture. DOM 0 also known as Domain 0, is a specialized
Virtual Machine running on the Xen Hypervisor with special privileges to access physical I/O
resources and communicate the other Virtual Machines running on the system. In its simplest
form, a DOM 0 is a modified Linux kernel, that must be running on all Xen Virtualization
environments before any other Virtual Machines can be started. In our framework, the DOM
0 kernel contains the Monitor and the Controller to form a MoCo VM.
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3.2.3. Application VM
An Application VM is a DOM U kernel found in the Xen architecture. DOM U also
known as the Domain U, is an unprivileged Virtual Machine running on Xen Hypervisor. Xen
currently supports both para virtualization and full virtualization. In para virtualization,
the guest kernel has to be modified in order to run on Xen e.g. Linux OS, Solaris, FreeBSD
et. Virtual Machines running such a kernel are known as DOM U PV Guest. Whereas in
full virtualization, the guest kernel is not modified e.g. Windows. Virtual Machines running
such a kernel is known as DOM U HVM Guest. In the proposed framework, a DOM U
kernel is used to run the Secure Application that utilizes the security mechanisms provided
by the underlying plugged-in secure architecture.
3.2.4. Event Trigger Mechanism
Event trigger provides a mechanism to initiate inter virtual machine communication.
Traditionally Xen provides some mechanisms and tools like split driver, xenstore, grant table
and ring buffers to carry out inter VM communication. However the primary drawback of
these mechanisms and tools is that they need the support from DOM U kernel to initiate
communication. The proposed framework assumes all DOM U kernels to be untrustworthy
and vulnerable to attacks. Hence we have avoided the use of these traditional mechanisms
and have developed a new inter VM communication mechanism through the use of hypercalls
and virtual interrupts (VIRQs), that are not dependent on the DOM U kernel. A hypercall
works similar to a system call in a kernel or an OS. It is an interrupt typically INT 81h
in Xen used to switch the control between the kernel and the Xen hypervisor. Hypercall
interrupt the processor and are trapped in Xen using Hypercall Handler functions. VIRQ is
a software interrupt notified by setting up a bit in the Virtual CPU data structure present
in Xen.
3.2.5. Secure Architecture Plug-in Interface
The SAPI is a generic interface exposed by our framework to easily interface a secure
architecture. SAPI is a collection of APIs which are used to modify virtual CPU (VCPU),
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virtual memory management unit (VMMU) and provide memory introspection functions
into the modified components of the Xen. Secure architectures are typically changes in CPU
and memory of the hardware which facilitates secure execution and isolation of a process.
These components are available as software modules in Xen, it would be easy to modify them
and program (or change) according to different secure architectures. As shown in Figure 3.1,
the SAPI primarily has three components: modified VCPU API, modified VMMU API and
modified memory introspection API. The modified VCPU API has all the set of functions
which modifies the Virtual CPU provided by Xen. These modifications include providing
encryption and decryption capabilities to the processor, add extra and secure registers, mod-
ify or implement new cache memories etc. The modified VMMU has set of functions which
enhance the existing virtual memory management Unit provided by Xen. These changes
include switching on/off the conventional virtual memory layout of the operating system,
encrypting and decrypting functions for main memory and adding additional access restric-
tions to the memory access of secure process memory pages. Though there are memory
introspection functions already available by the Xen VMM, these threats are invalidated
once security architecture is invoked. Hence new set of newly customized/modified memory
introspection functions are needed for each secure architecture.
3.2.6. Monitor
Monitor is a program running in the DOM 0 that receives notifications about the
Secure Application through VIRQs. It is responsible for monitoring critical events pertaining
to the Secure Application and detect any possible software attacks on it. It contains a
monitoring script which is a collection of watch events and actions to be performed when a
particular event has occurred.
3.2.7. Controller
The security architectures should be rigorously tested against various attacks. These
attacks are almost similar for all the architectures. Hence we used a collection of such
attacks called the Controller. The Controller is a collection of host and network based
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attacks launched from the DOM 0. While a secure application is running in the Application
VM, controller mounts attacks on that application. A detailed attack model in presented in
Section 3.2.11.
3.2.8. Secure Application
Secure Application is a special process whose memory is required to be protected from
attacks on the system. This process is aware of the security mechanisms provided by the
secure architecture plugged in to our framework. Secure Applications or processes protect
their confidential data by storing them in specialized protected memory regions.
3.2.9. Attacker VM
Similar to the Controller, the Attacker VM is used to launch inter VM attacks on the
secure application running in the Application VM.
3.2.10. Framework Functioning
The first step of the functioning is to plug-in a secure architecture by using the generic
interface provided by the SAPI. Once this is done, the VCPU, VMMU and virtual memory
introspection functions are appropriately modified to align with the plugged-in secure archi-
tecture. All the information pertaining to the security mechanisms provided by the secure
architecture is then reported to the Monitor through the Event Trigger mechanism. The
Monitor thus now has complete visibility and understanding of the secure regions within
the secure architecture. Now the Secure Application can start executing in the Application
VM. Typically, the entire memory allocated to the Secure Application need not be confi-
dential and hence has no need to be protected. A Secure Application identifies its critical
confidential data and then transitions to secure execution state.
In the proposed framework, this is achieved by invoking a secure hypercall enter vbase.
Once the Secure Application invokes this hypercall, the Secure Architecture and the Monitor
are informed about the secure execution of the application. Its now the responsibility of the
Secure Architecture to protect the confidential data of the application, while the Monitor
is responsible for tracking all the necessary events related to the application. While the
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application is executing securely, the Monitor informs the Controller to conduct a series of
attacks on the secure application. During this time, the Attacker VM is also initiated to
carry out inter VM attacks on the secure application. The secure application can exit secure
execution by invoking the exit vbase hypercall. At this instant, the Monitor stops tracking
the events while the Controller and Attacker VM stop the attacks on the application. Once
the secure application terminates, all the events recorded by the Monitor are available for
review in a log file. This file serves as a benchmark to judge the effectiveness of the security
mechanisms provided by the secure architectures.
3.2.11. Attack Model
In practice Secure Applications are modified to directly communicate with the secure
architectures. Ideally this communication should by pass the standard communication mech-
anisms used by other applications, i.e. through the operating system. The primary reason
being these other applications and the OS may have vulnerabilities that can be exploited by
an adversary and hence are untrustworthy.
Instead of rooting the trust of Secure Applications in the OS, it is rooted in the
secure architectures plugged into the framework. The software components in a computing
system are susceptible to attacks like spoofing, splicing and replay. In a spoofing attack, an
adversary successfully masquerades as an authorized entity to intercept valid requests from
another authorized entity and returns a faulty or a malicious response to that request. A
splicing attack is the one in which an adversary intercepts valid requests from an authorized
entity and returns a valid but an unwanted response to the request. And finally in a replay
attack, an adversary returns stale copies of responses to the requests made by authorized
entities.
Figure 3.2.11 shows the generic threat model considered for the proposed architecture.
Here the Virtualization Layer, Xen VMM containing the secure architecture and the Secure
Application are two trusted entities, whereas the OS i.e DOM U kernel and other applications
are considered to be untrustworthy. The major attack sources are network attacks, spoofing





















Figure 3.2. Attack Model
the untrusted entities in the system.
3.3. Implementation
We have implemented a secure architecture within the Xen VMM. This secure archi-
tecture provides two hypercall functions enter vbase and exit vbase to enter and exit secure
execution. A hypercall handler is used to encode security architecture functionality. More
robust and sophisticated security architectures can be done as separate modules (security
components) with in the VMM. In any application a lot of code is derived from publicly
available libraries. This code is not sensitive or critical from security perspective. Hence,
most of the code need not be secured.
In the implemented example, we assume that secure process allocates a chunk of
26
memory. This chunk of memory is used to store all the security critical data. This is very
similar to the heap allocated and maintained by JVM. The framework protects this chunk of
memory using the implemented secure architecture. For ease, we have created the memory
in the size of a page and aligned it to the beginning of the page boundary.
Algorithm 1 Secure Process Execution
1: Secure Process Begins
2: Allocate Secure Memory
3: The virtual address of secure memory is passed through ring3 hypercall
4: Virtual address of secure memory is received in hypervisor
5: Guest Frame Number (GFN) is computed for the received Guest Virtual Address (GVA)
6: Machine Frame Number (MFN) is computed for the GFN
7: MFN is made read-only
8: Virtual Interrupt (VIRQ) is sent to DOM 0
9: VIRQ is received in the DOM 0 kernel
10: DOM 0 kernel sends signal to the Monitor
11: Monitor prints messages to user
The working of the secure process in conjunction with the security architecture is
described in Algorithm 1 followed by code explanation. It is important to emphasize that
the prototype implemented in this paper is just a small instance of the framework. This
prototype serves as a proof of concept to prove the effectiveness of the framework.
This implementation includes a very simple hardware secure architecture functional-
ity and not a fully functional architecture. The implementation is not as powerful as the
framework itself as its primary goal is to show the readers how an application can be secured
in a virtualized environment. The secure application runs in a HVM DOM U. Once the
secure process starts execution, it allocates a chunk of memory for secure data/variables.
Later the secure process will allocate memory out of this secure chunk of memory to the
secure data/variables.
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The implemented security architecture uses vBASE to secure this chunk of memory.
To achieve this, the secure process copies the virtual address of the secure chunk of memory
and passes it to the hypervisor. The size of the secure chunk of memory is aligned with
that of the memory pages. It is relatively easier to mark the pages read-only than making
individual memory locations read-only.
The primary advantage of our implementation is that, it eliminates the Operating
System in making the secure process’s memory read-only. To achieve this, it uses the CPUID
instruction. Because all other instructions except CPUID are short circuited to the operating
system’s interrupt table and do not trap in to the VMM. CPUID, on the other hand, will
trap directly into the VMM. CPUID is originally intended to report processor’s features to
ring-3 software applications. It takes various parameters and reports different features of the
processor depending on those parameters. A custom parameter — 0x92 has been added to
the CPUID instruction. This parameter is passed in the eax register and takes the virtual
address of the secure memory in the ebx register.
The secure application code containing the CPUID instruction is trapped in the
VMM. The VMM recognizes the operand 0x92 and passes the virtual address to the SAPI
component described in vBASE framework. In the SAPI component, the virtual address is
translated into Guest Frame Number (GFN) and eventually into Machine Frame Number
(MFN). This MFN is then made read-only and a Virtual Interrupt (VIRQ) is sent to the
DOM 0. The VIRQ is handled by the kernel module in the DOM 0 and it notifies the
Monitor through a signal. The monitor prints the confirmation message to the user and the
secure process resumes its execution. Since the secure memory pages are protected by the
VMM, even overwriting requests from OS will be ignored. The xm daemon will report if any
such attempts to overwrite the read-only (secure) pages is done.
3.3.1. Source Code Implementation
In the listing 3.1, a chunk of memory (secure mem) of PAGE SIZE is allocated and
the beginning of the chunk of the memory is aligned to beginning of a page.
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char secure_mem[PAGE_SIZE] secure_memory __attribute__ (( __aligned__(
PAGE_SIZE)));
Listing 3.1. Secure Memory Allocation
In listing 3.2 we declared a long pointer (secret key) and type casted the char buffer pointer to
an long pointer (secret mem). The secret key is assigned the address of the secure memory.
Now the contents of the address contained in secret key will be stored in the chunk of mem-
ory allocated in listing 3.1.
long * secret_key =(long *) secret_mem;
*secret_key = 654321;
Listing 3.2. Secret Key Linked to Secure Memory
The address of the secret key is to be protected by making the memory location of the secret
key read only. In listing 3.3, we pass the secret key to the hypervisor using ring3 hypercall.
This is an assembly macro which takes the virtual address of the secure memory and a
command integer as parameters. In the macro these parameters are passed as operands for
the CPUID instruction. The CPUID instruction will then trap into VMM.
Along with the virtual address we send a command to the SAPI module in the
hypervisor which decides the action to be performed on the virtual address. Initially we
will send a PROTECT command. This will protect the virtual address by making the
corresponding Machine Frame Number read-only. Originally Xen allows hypercalls to be
done only through privileged interface in the operating system. But we have solved this
problem by using CPUID instruction.
We call this mechanism as ring3 hypercall, which stands for hypercalls made from
ring3 of DOM U.
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unsigned long gva=( unsigned long) secret_key;
ret = ring3_hypercall(gva , PROTECT);
Listing 3.3. Pass the virtual address to the VMM
Hypercalls are trapped into the VMM, thus giving VMM the control over process
execution. The function of the VMM, where hypercall is handled is called as the hypercall
handler. The Guest Virtual Address (GVA) is received in the hypercall handler and Machine
Frame Number (MFN) is computed which is the hardware machine’s RAM frame number.
The function that computes MFN needs Guest Frame Number (GFN) as the argument. So
first we computed GFN using paging gva to gfn() function.
This GFN is then passed on to the gmfn to mfn where MFN is calculated. This MFN
is marked read-only by the xen’s in built function. This function requires previous type (read-
only, write-able) of the MFN. Hence we first invoke a function which returns the old type of
the MFN. The MFN is passed along with the old type and new type (p2m ram ro). This will
update the MFN type in xen’s tables. Any further requests to overwrite the pages identified
by the MFN are dropped by xen. Attempts for trying to write to the read-only MFN are






gfn=paging_gva_to_gfn(current , gva , &pfec)
mfn=gfn_to_mfn(d, gfn , &old_type);
p2m_change_type(d, gfn , ot,p2m_ram_ro);
Listing 3.4. Translate GVA to MFN and mark MFN read-only
In listing 3.5 the code sends a global VIRQ to the DOM 0. In Xen, VIRQ’s are handled by
the guests as interrupts. So we need to bind the VIRQ to an IRQ Handler. After the VIRQ is
populated from the hypercall handler, the DOM 0 is resumed and an interrupt (dynamically
bound by the kernel) is issued. This will trap the control into the IRQ handler bound earlier.
send_guest_global_virq(dom0 , VIRQ_VBASE);
bind_virq_to_irqhandler(VIRQ_VBASE ,0,vbase_handler ,NULL ,NULL , 0);
Listing 3.5. Dispatch VIRQ from Xen
In listing 3.6 the task structure of the Monitor process is found using find task by pid func-
tion provided by the kernel (note that pid of the monitor can be sent through a system call
or by writing to kernel filesystems). After finding the task struct a signal is issued to the




send_sig_info(SIG_VBASE , &info , task_structure);
Listing 3.6. Dispatch a SIGNAL to the Monitor
Therefore it is evident from the prototype implementation, that the implemented
security architecture detects any unwanted modification to the secure application memory.
These modifications can result from malicious applications, VMs, vulnerable OS and network
channels. The secure architecture embedded in the vBASE framework, for implementation
purposes, employs an encryption and integrity verification mechanism. This allows the
security architecture to detect malicious modifications and eventually discard them.
Similarly, different hardware secure architectures could be embedded with vBASE to
bolster the security features in cloud computing.
3.4. CTrust Framework2
We then extended vBASE architecture and implemented in a cloud environment. The
motivation for the proposed CTrust Framework is to provide security to the applications
running in a cloud by rooting there trust in the underlying VMM/hypervisor.
3.4.1. CTrust Architecture
The intuition behind the CTrust architecture is to deploy the vBASE framework in
a cloud environment to provide security and root of trust to the applications running in the
cloud. Figure 3.3 shows the proposed CTrust Architecture. This represents a private cloud
built on top of the vBASE framework. In this architecture, the cloud is composed of a cluster
of real computing machines known as the physical nodes. The nodes can be easily added to
the cloud based on its load. Each node is connected to each other via a physical network. The
CTrust architecture is implemented on XCP 1.0 [1] that contains XEN Hypervisor version
3.4.x and CentOS with 2.6.32.x Linux kernel. Since the vBASE framework is developed
2This section of CTrust has previously appeared in S. Nimgaonkar, S. Kotikela, M. Gomathisankaran,








































Figure 3.3. CTrust Cloud Framework
by modifying the XEN hypervisor, it is possible to replace the original XEN hypervisor in
XCP 1.0 with the vBASE (modified hypervisor) framework. However it is important to
emphasize that the mechanisms used to develop both vBASE and CTrust are generic to any
virtualization software.
The CTrust architecture is implemented with one HVM unprivileged virtual machine.
A HVM domain is a type of XEN VM which is capable of running unmodified operating
systems (e.g. Windows). XEN originally did not support unmodified operating systems.
However Intel added support for this in it’s Intel VT technology [134]. Now it is possible to
run unmodified operating systems in HVM domain. The HVM domain has been chosen to
implement CTrust for two reasons. The first reason was to present a solution which doesn’t
require changes to operating systems. The second reason is that the HVM guests have great
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paging support available in XEN API. However, it is important to stress that the same
solution would be easier to port to PV domains also. The primary reason for this is that a
PV domain runs a modified OS which is aware of the changes done by the underlying VMM.
3.4.2. Security Analysis
The root of trust for the security of CTrust is the vBASE framework. The vBASE
framework keeps track of the execution of the protected cloud application by monitoring
all the events in the system. Whenever the application’s execution is interrupted, vBASE
encrypts and hashes all the memory pages of the application. When the application resumes
its execution vBASE checks for the integrity of the pages before allowing it to execute.
Thus both the confidentiality and integrity of the application is protected by CTrust. The
novelty of CTrust is that it not only provides protection mechanisms but also means to record
events for auditing. The event trigger mechanism of the secure hypervisor report the events,
application level, OS level, network level, and hardware level, to the Monitor program, which
creates a log that can be used to prove that the application executed as expected.
3.5. Related Work
3.5.1. Hardware based secure execution
In the recent years, Intel SGX [41, 42], has become a potential alternative to the
yesteryear hardware security architectures. Intel SGX feature is available as an extension,
through additional instructions, to the general purpose CPU. Intel SGX provides confiden-
tiality and integrity guarantees similar to vBASE. However, it inherits some of the challenges
of the hardware security architectures. Being implementing in the hardware, Intel SGX may
have unforeseen security issues [69] that can become hard to debug and fix. By leveraging
the software layer, it is much more practical to design flexible security architectures that can
be tested and improved as necessary.
3.5.2. Process-level Isolation using Virtualization
[24] dfork is a clone of posix fork in which a separate kernel and filesystem is allocated
to every new process to isolate its operations and interactions of other processes with the
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secured process. This method also gives an ability to review the changes done by the appli-
cation before committing to the underlying hardware. Thus giving us the control to accept
some changes, keep some isolated, and discard others entirely. dfork is also recursive, in the
sense that a secured process can in turn spawn another secure process. Our architecture
doesn’t try to modify or override existing OS functionalities. It adds minimum overhead
(hypercalls and VIRQs) to secure applications.
3.5.3. Quebes OS
[71] Joanna Rutkowska introduces a new (modified Linux) operating system called
Quebes OS. It is very similar to dfork in a way that every process that is being secured
gets its own kernel and environment in a virtualized container. The quebes approach uses
a lightweight templating mechanism to create new virtual machine for every process to be
secured on the fly. A copy of light-weight operating system (assumed to be secure) is saved
in the control of VMM and whenever a user wants to run an application securely, a new
virtual machine based on the secure copy is instantiated and the application is run in the
virtual machine and only that application is run in that virtual machine. The (isolation)
security provided by the Quebes OS is based on the (widely accepted) fact of strong isolation
provided by Xen. Our architecture doesn’t use any more resources than actually necessary
for the application. Instead of running the application in its own virtual machine to isolate,
our architecture focuses on security critical code and tries to isolate only security sensitive
code in the VMM using existing VMM functionality.
3.5.4. Singularity
[65] Microsoft OS research proposes a novel approach to solve the process isolation
problem by introducing a new concept of Software Assisted process isolation as opposed to
widely accepted, de-facto, standard of hardware assisted process isolation. Singularity ad-
dresses the performance penalties of hardware based isolation and how this penalties force
OS developers to break the intended design and make the OS insecure. Software assisted
isolation tries to exploit the advancements in language technologies such as objects and mes-
sages and advocates usage of advanced languages to build secure operating systems. In our
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architecture we don’t have to introduce new operating system, environment or applications.
We have shown that applications can be secured with in the existing environments without
much effort.
3.5.5. Framework for Design Validation of Security Architectures
Framework for Design Validation of Security Architectures [48] showed how security
architectures can be implemented in virtualized environments and explained how security
components can be embedded in virtualization layer to mimic hardware security architectures
in the virtualized environments. The framework is then shown to be used to test security
architectures and rapid prototyping of security architectures. This was implemented using
VMware is more of a testing framework.
3.6. Future Work
Security through virtualization technology is a very promising and upcoming field.
There is lot of research going on exploring many ways to leverage the widely used virtual-
ization. It would be no surprise if future computer systems ship with virtualization software
along with firmware. Which means virtualized solutions for security would be more common
place in coming future. We can build more functional security components in the virtualiza-
tion layer. These components can be exported to applications through an API. This would
help application developers in building secure applications with less effort and no rework.
The monitor can be made more powerful by adding more functionality like looking
into the entire process memory and detect malicious activity while safe guarding the security
intensive memory regions. Monitor can also be made interactive, where it receives a set of
commands to monitor specific functions/memory regions, events through an input file. We
can create an environment which automates various types of attacks on the secure process
and let the monitor get the effects of the attack. This gives quantified data about the
effectiveness of the security architecture. As many businesses are moving towards cloud
computing [43] which is majorly deployed over virtualization layers, we can implement our
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architecture in public and private clouds to ensure various challenges such as: confidentiality
and data integrity [151]. Also, in future, when virtualization becomes prevalent on the
desktop systems our architecture can be used to ensure the security of the applications.
3.7. Summary
We have successfully shown how security architectures can be built and implemented
easily and efficiently using virtualization technology. We have proposed a Virtualization
Based Secure Execution and Testing Framework and implemented its prototype using xen
virtualization layer. The framework proves to be secure against unauthorized over-writing
of security sensitive memory locations. By removing Operating System from the Trusted




RACE-FREE ON-DEMAND INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT1
4.1. Introduction
In Chapter 3, we saw how we can provide secure execution in a virtualized environ-
ment. Along with the secure execution environment, it is important to have verified trust in
that environment. In this chapter, we will review some of the existing solutions for estab-
lishing a trusted environment and how they fall short to provide dynamic and on-demand
trust guarantees. Further, we will present our own solution Radium, to provide on-demand
integrity measurements.
In the PC platform, a chain-of-trust is established from hardware to application by
the hardware measuring firmware, firmware measuring the system software, and the system
software measuring the application. This chain-of-trust is anchored in hardware which is
the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM). CRTM is an immutable function, which
measures the first component in the chain, and can be implicitly trusted. There are two
approaches to establish a chain-of-trust in PC platform. The first approach, known as Static
Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM) [36], measures all the components sequentially
during system boot and can ensure that the application is running in a trusted environment.
Conversely, the Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM) [66] can establish
the chain-of-trust at any time of system execution. DRTM is invoked by special instructions
to create an isolated and measured execution environment for the secure software. DRTM
uses virtualization technology to create and protect this isolated execution environment. One
of the typical usecases of DRTM is to instantiate the isolated execution environment during
system boot (called here as DRTM-at-boot), by the boot loader. This is used to setup a
trusted environment at the time of system boot.
The fundamental axiom, on which trust is built in SRTM and DRTM-at-boot ap-
1Majority of this chapter has previously appeared in S. Kotikela, T. Shah, M. Gomathisankaran, G.
Taban (2015) International Conference on Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT). Reproduced with
permission from ASE journal.
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proaches, is that the system components do not change after they are measured. When this
axiom is broken either through the vulnerabilities or through design flaws, a race condition
is created between the time of measurement and time of use leading to TOCTTOU attacks.
One way to avoid this race condition is to use an approach followed by Flicker [92]:
synchronize measure, launch, and use of the trusted application with the time of check.
However, this approach limits the type of trusted applications because the overhead in setting
up a trusted environment is very high. The alternate approach is to use synchronize the
measurement and use of the trusted application which can be asynchronous to the launch.
In other words, measure the application and environment whenever it needs to be used for
security sensitive tasks irrespective of when it is launched.
Flicker [92] uses DRTM to invoke an isolated and measured execution environment
for the application any time after boot. In DRTM only one isolated environment is allowed
to execute. The system would initially boot normally into an untrusted environment from
which, DRTM instructions are invoked to launch an isolated trusted execution environment.
Subsequently a small Piece of Application Logic (PAL) is executed in this environment. This
PAL is completely isolated from the untrusted environment including the runtime provided
by the operating system. As there is no interaction with the untrusted environment, PALs
are built with limited libraries and functionality. Minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
is also another motivation for limited PAL size which leads to limited functionality. This
limits the type of trusted applications or services supported by PAL architecture. In this
architecture the PALs or the trusted services are to be invoked by the untrusted environment.
This approach gives the untrusted environment the ability to deny the launching of the
trusted service or modifying the state of the untrusted environment to spoof the trusted
service. For example a root-kit can unload itself before invoking a trusted root-kit detector
service.
To address these problems, we propose Radium - Race-free on-demand integrity mea-
surement architecture. Radium uses a control domain, which interfaces with the hypervisor
to launch measuring services. The Radium architecture uses this measuring service for on-
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demand integrity measurement. The measuring service is is invoked whenever the software
component needs to be used and thus prevents TOCTTOU attacks. Radium architecture
provides an access control mechanism to allow trusted services access to untrusted services
and communicate with other trusted services. This access control mechanism allows for fine
granular access to untrusted components and enables measuring services to perform more
semantic measurements than just cryptographic hash.
In this chapter we present a prototype of Radium architecture designed using Xen
hypervisor. We use a DomU Virtual Machine (VM) as our measuring service. Enabling
us to measure other virtual machines running on top of Xen. We also present an example
application, Trusted Rootkit Detector. We have noticed that using a measuring service is
more efficient than measuring the entire untrusted environment.
4.2. Related Work
In this section we will study some of the projects that relate to Radium. With the
advancement of TPM and Trusted Computing enabled hardware many projects have created





















Figure 4.1. Static Root of Trust for Measurement
4.2.1. SRTM and DRTM
SRTM and DRTM are two trusted computing solutions that use TPM to set up a
measured trusted environment for a trusted application to execute.
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In SRTM approach, as shown in Figure 4.1, hardware CRTM measures the platform
configurations and the BIOS, BIOS measures the bootloader, bootloader measures the OS
kernel, and OS kernel measures the application to be launched in a trusted environment.
After each component is measured, the measurement is extended into the Platform Config-
uration Registers (PCR) of the TPM. The TPM version 2 has 24 PCRs. SRTM uses the
static PCRs (0–15) to store the measurements and these static PCRs are reset at the time of
system boot. These measurements together with platform configurations form the state of
the platform. In SRTM it is ensured that each measurement is done by a trusted (previously
measured) component. As the SRTM chain-of-trust includes bootloader, SRTM can only be
established during the system boot. Hence every time a trusted measured environment is to
















Figure 4.2. Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement
In DRTM approach the chain-of-trust is initiated by special platform specific instruc-
tion. The DRTM invoking instruction takes a memory address as a parameter. This memory
address points to the program that needs to be measured and executed in an isolated en-
vironment, commonly known as Measured Launch Environment (MLE). A DRTM isolated
execution environment is set up as follows. Once the DRTM setup instruction is invoked,
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the processor suspends all threads of execution (if any) and starts a new isolated thread of
execution, as shown in Figure 4.2. The CRTM measures an optional Authenticated Code
Module (ACM) and the measurement is extended to the TPM’s PCR. In turn the ACM
measures the MLE and the measurement value is extended into the TPM. After extending
the state of the MLE into TPM, virtualization is enabled and the MLE is loaded into the
memory with virtualization protection. The virtualization protection restricts access to the
loaded program from any other process or firmware, thus keeping it secure from any possible
attacks. Then the MLE is given control to execute.
The first measurement of the DRTM chain-of-trust is extended to the dynamic PCR
17. This PCR can only be extended by the hardware CRTM and this extension is performed
only with the special DRTM instruction. As the special DRTM instruction suspends all
other threads of execution, possibly malicious, it eliminates all threats of attack and ensures
the security of the program running in DRTM. DRTM can be invoked at anytime including
at the system boot. DRTM at the boot time is similar to SRTM in functionality except that,
DRTM is more secure with virtualization protection enabled. Typically DRTM is used by
the boot loader to launch measured hypervisor program during the system boot.
4.2.2. AMD SVM and Intel TXT
AMD Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) [22] and Intel Trusted eXecution Technology
(TXT) [67] are two platform solutions which provide SRTM and DRTM support. SVM uses
special instruction called SKINIT to invoke a DRTM environment and TXT uses GETSEC[SENTER]
instruction to start the DRTM environment. Both these instructions take a memory address
as the parameter. This memory address points to the program (hypervisor or an application)
that should be executed in an isolated execution environment.
Intel TXT first verifies the digital signature of ACM and validates it. The corre-
sponding key for the ACM’s digital signature is hardcoded into the platform. The ACM’s
validation is extended to PCR 17 and the validated ACM is executed to ensure that the
platform has the necessary support for DRTM. Then the ACM measures and extends the
measurement of the program (pointed by the memory address parameter) into the PCR 18.
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In case of AMD SVM, there is no ACM. So, the chain-of-trust starts with the measurement
of the program pointed by the memory address. Once validated, virtualization protection is
enabled and the program is loaded into virtualization isolated memory space. Once validated
the program is given control over to execute. After this the program has access to all the
dynamic PCRs. So the TPM quote executed by the program can contain dynamic PCRs
and proves that the program has been measured by the trusted hardware.
Figure 4.3. Adversary Model
4.2.3. Measured Boot
Trusted GRUB [133] is one of the first trusted computing solutions which used SRTM
to provide the measured boot. tboot [38] is a project from Intel that uses DRTM to provide
measured boot. By using DRTM, tboot enables memory isolation from other environments
as well as any malicious I/O devices. The Open Security Loader (Oslo) [108] is an open
source boot loader focusing on security through minimal TCB. The entire Oslo codebase is
around 1000 lines and with such minimal code base, Oslo can be more thoroughly tested
for bugs and vulnerabilities. In [33] Butterworth et al., analyzed CRTM and presented
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certain vulnerabilities in the CRTM. Time sensitive attestation has been proposed to fix
problems with these vulnerabilities. All these solutions use TPM to store and report the
measurements.
4.2.4. Trusted Hypervisor
Terra [53] is a trusted hypervisor solution which uses cryptographic functions to
securely isolate the virtual machines. Terra supports two types of VMs, namely closed-
box VM and open-box VM. The closed-box VM is used to implement proprietary hardware
platforms such as gaming hardware. All the code and data of a closed-box VM is encrypted
and protected even from the host owner. Open-box VMs are used to run open systems such
as personal computer. Each VM is strongly isolated from other VMs and there is access for
closed-box VM to a open-box VM or vice-versa. TrustVisor [91] is a hypervisor as root-of-
trust solution and uses software TPM for measurements. TrustVisor is a single rich guest
only hypervisor. It lets one single rich guest execute on top of it and this single rich guest
can invoke security sensitive Piece of Application Logic (PAL) dynamically. When the PAL
is executing, all the untrusted OS and applications are suspended. PALs are self contained
code executing independently. Due to lack of the common application development libraries,
PALs are built with very limited functionality. Since TrustVisor design is modeled after
DRTM, the PAL executes in complete isolation. The PALs don’t run concurrently neither
there is any inter-PAL communication.
4.2.5. Hypervisor based access control
Xen and KVM are premier opensource hypervisor solutions. Both these hypervisors
support Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [116, 31] allowing a fine granular policy enforce-
ment. They filter the hypercalls from the virtual machines and allow only those hypercalls
that are conforming to the policy. These MAC mechanisms are modeled after SeLinux [90].
Both systems provide a secure sandbox environment for multi-tenant virtual machines on a
single host.
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4.2.6. Rootkit Detection Solutions
The virtualization based solution presented in [157] is geared towards designing a
rootkit detector for guest virtual machines via deep information extraction and reconstruc-
tion at the hypervisor level. The virtual machine memory is reconstructed by locating static
data entries of the kernel system map. The guest VM will extract its own memory and the
hypervisor will extract the guest VM’s memory from the shadow pages. A comparison will
be performed against the two memory snapshots. Whether the extracted states are iden-
tical or not cross-verification will also be performed. A socket communication will be used
between the hypervisor and the untrusted guest VM and the detection can be initiated by
either side. Taking memory snapshot of the whole VM and comparing it to the OS report is
a time consuming process compared to measuring only necessary pages. The Copilot [113] is
designed to detect malicious modification to a host kernel on a separate PCI add-in card with
a low performance cost to the host machine. Depending on the configuration the Copilot
monitors and examines the host RAM to detect malicious malware through Direct Memory
Access without the knowledge or intervention of the host kernel. Since it runs on its own PCI
it does not rely on the correctness of the host and is resistant to tampering from the host.
It periodically computes hashes over key parts of memory that impact kernel execution,
compares against a known value, and reports to an external system that enables manual
decisions to be made regarding detected changes. Copilot adds the cost of the hardware and
this hardware cannot be programmed to implement other trusted services in the hardware.
4.2.7. Hypervisor based monitoring and introspection
Due to various advantages of using hypervisor as the root-of-trust, many monitoring
and introspection security solutions have been proposed [27] using Virtual Machine Intro-
spection (VMI). By using HyperAgents [32], agents that run on behalf of the hypervisor,
many security services can be provided to the guest Operating Systems. This also reduces
the necessity of running such a solution inside every guest. In [131], Tang et al., demonstrates
how to provide an AntiVirus solution using the VMI. By utilizing the VMI, it is possible to
not have any in-guest agent. This can improve detection rate against malware that changes
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its behavior in presence of monitoring agent. These monitoring and introspection capabilities
can also be extended to Cloud Computing systems with minimal overhead [145].
4.3. Adversary Model
In our adversary model, the objective of the adversary is to spoof the measurements
stored in the TPM. We classify the adversary based on the attack target and the time
of attack. Attack targets are various components of the architecture the adversary can
attack to achieve this objective. Adversary can attack these components offline — before
the components are launched or used, and online — while the component is being used.
Figure 4.3 shows various attack targets an attacker would be aiming attacking and possible
exploits that can be performed.
The various attack targets we consider in our adversary model are described in the
sections below.
4.3.1. Hardware
At hardware level, the adversary can replace or modify the CPU with a malicious
CPU offline. This malicious CPU is capable of spoofing presumed good measurements to
the TPM irrespective of the state of the software running. This will allow attacker to run
malicious software without being detected. While the system is online, the attacker can
attach malicious devices that can steal information and gain access to various information
passing through the system interconnections and also the LPC bus. These attacks will leak
sensitive information from the system including various TPM commands and measurements.
4.3.2. Hypervisor
When the system is offline, an attacker can attempt to modify the hypervisor binary
and make it malicious. As hypervisor runs at the highest privilege level, a malicious/-
compromised hypervisor can give attacker control over the measuring service and all other
environments running on the hypervisor. This will let attacker feed incorrect hash values
to the measuring service and spoof a known good state of the system. While the system
is online, an attacker can run a virtual machine or a trusted measuring service on top of
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the hypervisor. Attacker can use these interfaces to attack the hypervisor via hypercalls.
Vulnerabilities in the hypercall API can lead to privileged access of the hypervisor to the
attacker.
4.3.3. Target VM
Target VM in Radium is typically used to run applications and services. Radium
integrity measurement aims to ensure the trustworthiness of the VMs. While the target VM
is offline, attacker can try to manipulate the VM image and corrupt it. While it is online,
attacker can use other VMs to launch an inter-VM channel attacks or use remote attacks
via network.
4.3.4. Trusted Service
Trusted Service is a crucial component in Radium’s architecture. As the Trusted
Services are implemented using a VM, the same attacks applicable for the VM are applicable
for the Trusted Service. By compromising the Trusted Service, an attacker can spoof the
state of the target VM, in which user applications and services are running, and present it
to be in a known good state.
4.4. Radium: Architecture Overview
In this chapter we propose a novel Race-free On-demand Integrity Measurement Ar-
chitecture (Radium) that uses DRTM and Virtualization mechanisms to provide a mea-
surement architecture that allows on-demand measurements to be performed as and when
needed. On-demand measurements are independent of booting the system and launching
the environment. This means, an application can be launched any time and used any time
while ensuring the trust through measurement at the time of using the application. Radium
consists of a hypervisor, access control policy, one or more measuring services and any com-
bination of trusted and untrusted environments. The root-of-trust for Radium is provided
by Asynchronous Root of Trust for Measurement (ARTM).
We use an example scenario to explain the architecture. Consider a platform which





























Figure 4.4. Radium Architecture
application in a trustworthy manner and prove its execution to a third party verifier. In
DRTM such a scenario requires that the VM be launched when the application needs to be
executed. Whereas Radium allows on-demand measurements and the VM can be launched
and measured independently. Thus in Radium, before executing the security sensitive ap-
plication it is possible to measure VM and check if it is trustworthy at the time of use.
Figure 4.4 shows various components of Radium architecture and communication between
these components. Each individual component is described in the following paragraphs.
4.4.1. ARTM
We propose a novel Asynchronous Root of Trust for Measurement (ARTM) architec-
ture which uses both Virtualization Technology (VT) and DRTM that enables asynchronous
use of an MLE. We achieve this by creating a Measuring Service to provide use-time mea-
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surement services to other MLEs. In ARTM the hypervisor is brought up using DRTM
at system boot. After the hypervisor is launched by the hardware DRTM, any target VM
can be launched. A measured execution environment that provides measurement services
to other environments will be launched to verify the trustworthiness of the target VM on-
demand. This execution environment/VM is known as Measuring Service (MS) in Radium
architecture.
The key difference between DRTM and ARTM is that the isolation in ARTM does
not require other execution environments to be suspended. The hypervisor in Radium is
trusted to provide strong hardware isolation between all the processes running on top of it,
even when these processes are running concurrently. As Radium relies on the hypervisor
to provide trusted isolation between all virtual machines and the measuring services, the
hypervisor becomes root-of-trust for isolation and measurement of trusted services. This
reliance on hypervisors for root-of-trust is justified as hypervisors have many orders small
size compared to the operating systems making them more trustworthy than the operating
systems.
Using hypervisor as the root-of-trust is a common practice in contemporary security
research [53, 91, 140]. This usage of hypervisor as the root for security solutions has en-
couraged the research efforts in minimizing the TCB of hypervisor [139, 125], making them
more modular [102] and minimizing the runtime interface of the hypersvisor resulting in
shrinking [74, 57] the attack surface. Automated formal verification of hypervisor has been
studied by Alkassar, Hillebrand, Paul, & Petrova [21]. Thus a formally verified hypervisor
with minimal TCB and minimal runtime interface can extend the security and trust provided
by hardware mechanisms such as DRTM to the applications.
4.4.2. Hypervisor
Hypervisor is a system software capable of running operating systems as processes.
In Radium, the hypervisor is a type-1 bare metal hypervisor which can run directly on
top of the hardware. Type-1 hypervisors typically have many orders smaller codebase and
consequentially, many orders smaller TCB. The hypervisor in Radium architecture is capable
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of running unmodified operating systems as well as applications like Unikernels [86]. This
hypervisor uses hardware mechanisms to isolate all VMs running on top of it. The hypervisor
exports hypercall (analogous to system calls in an operating system) for the applications and
services to interact with it. As the services in Radium architecture need to communicate
among each other, the hypervisor provides inter-VM communication mechanisms.
In Radium, hypervisor along with the trusted hardware mechanisms form the Trusted
Computing Base (TCB) and is trusted to perform as expected. To ensure the trustworthiness
of the hypervisor, it is always brought up using DRTM. The hypervisor includes an Access
Control Policy (ACP) module which is used to control interactions between various VMs and
applications. This ACP can use any access control mechanism such as Mandatory Access
Control (MAC) or Capability Based Access Control. All VMs are managed through an
Application Programming Interface (API) exposed by the hypervisor. This API allows local
as well as remote users launch VMs and measuring services as needed.
4.4.3. Trusted and Untrusted Environments
In Radium we define an environment as trusted if is measured, verified, and launched.
A trusted environment can provide any specific trusted service if the environment is used
immediately after the launch thus preventing any TOCTTOU attacks. An environment
that is launched with no measurement is considered to be an untrusted environment. These
two types of environments can co-exist and execute concurrently along with the trusted
services. Trust can be extended to an untrusted environment by a trusted measuring service
by measuring and verifying the untrusted environment at the time of its use.
Each environment in Radium is uniquely identified by an Universal Unique IDentifier
(UUID). This UUID is assigned to each environment during its creation and is used for
registration with the hypervisor. This UUID is used by the hypervisor internally to identify,
allocate resources to, and control each environment individually.
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4.4.4. Measuring Service
Measuring service is a trusted environment that measures other environments (target
VM). The measuring service is measured, verified, and launched only when another environ-
ment (VM) is to be measured. This service is used immediately as soon as it is launched
and is shut down as soon as it is done measuring. This immediate usage of the measuring
service ensures that it is not subjected to the TOCTTOU attacks. Radium requires at-least
one measuring service to provide on-demand measurement and it can support more than one
measuring service for different types of measurements.
Different measuring services may differ in the type of measurements they perform, for
example one service may measure the kernel for root-kit and other measuring service may
measure the environment for malware. Measuring services need to have necessary accesses
and permissions to perform the measurement. These permissions are granted through the
access policy rules. In a typical virtualized environment any virtual machine with necessary
permissions can act as a measuring service. Radium allows different measuring services to
communicate and cooperate with each other.
In Radium, hypervisor uses TPM to store the measurements of trusted services and
measuring services. The measuring services also use TPM to store the measurements of
target VMs. As the hypervisor is launched with DRTM, PCR 17 contains the measurement
of the hypervisor (18 in case of Intel TXT as the SINIT ACM’s measurement is stored in
PCR 17)and the remaining dynamic PCRs 18/19—22 are in the control of the hypervisor.
The hypervisor uses these PCRs to save the measurement of various measuring services and
trusted services. The measuring service uses PCR 23 to save the measurement of a target
VM.
4.4.5. Access Control Policy Module
Radium allows access between its environments through the Access Control Policy
Module (ACPM). ACPM is part of the hypervisor and executes in privilege level of the
hypervisor. The ACPM contains an access policy for the entire architecture. The access
policy is composed of rules that identifies the accessor environment and its corresponding
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accesses. ACPM monitors all accesses between the environments and allows only the accesses
that comply with the policy. Access requests that do not comply with the policy are denied.
If no policy rules are provided for an environment, it is subjected to a restrictive
default policy of no access. A non-trustworthy environment is never given access to the
resources of a trusted environment. Even the trusted services get only necessary access
permissions to the untrusted environment, for example to check the presence of a root-kit in
an untrusted environment the measuring service needs only read permissions to the target
environment. This prevents any malicious programs acting as trusted service to attack a
target environment.
Whenever any environment tries to interact with other environment, ACPM uses
UUID to identify each accessor and the accessee. After identifying the accessor, accessee, and
the operation accessor is trying to perform ACPM verifies from the policy if the accessor has
necessary permission. If the accessor has necessary permission, the operation is permitted,
else it is blocked by the ACPM.
4.4.6. Working
In this section we describe the working of various components of the Radium archi-
tecture.
Trusted Hypervisor Setup The hypervisor in Radium architecture is the first compo-
nent to be launched. It is launched during the system boot using DRTM. The boot-loader
uses special instructions to invoke a DRTM MLE and prepares an isolated execution envi-
ronment as explained in Section 4.2. Then the hypervisor is measured and compared with
a previously known good value which is stored in TPM non-volatile RAM (NVRAM) [38].
Depending on the platform the hypervisor is running on, AMD or Intel, the measurements
are stored in the PCR 17 or 18 respectively. If the measurements are same as the previously
known good value, the hypervisor is deemed trustworthy and executed. The hypervisor then
takes control of the platform.
Measuring Service Registration Measuring Service needs to be registered with the
hypervisor before it is available for measuring other environments. During registration pro-
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cess, the Measuring Service provides all the ACPM rules necessary for its operation to the
hypervisor. Hypervisor adds these rules to the ACPM policy and links it with the UUID of
the Measuring service. Also, the hypervisor measures the Measuring Service and saves the
known good value of the Measuring Service for future comparisons. The Measuring Service
is encrypted and the key is sealed into the TPM. At this point the state of the platform
contains the measurements of known good value of hypervisor. Thus the key is unsealed
only if the platform is running a known good value hypervisor.
Target VM Registration and Instantiation
Target VM is a normal VM that runs the hypervisor. The target VM also needs to
be registered with the hypervisor before executing. During this registration set of policy
rules are provided to the hypervisor which contain UUID of the Measuring Service that can
access this particular target VM and with what permissions. Hypervisor registers the UUID
of the Target VM and the Target VM will be instantiated after its registration.
Launching the Measuring Service Measuring Service is invoked to measure the Target
VM via hypervisor’s Application Programming Interface (API) calls. A Measuring Service
has to be invoked while the Target VM is running, else appropriate error is reported. Before
launching the Measuring Service, the image needs to be decrypted. The necessary key is
only unsealed if the platform is executing a known good value hypervisor. In the presence
of the known good value hypervisor, the key is unsealed and the Measuring Service image
is decrypted. Then the Measuring Service is measured and compared with its previously
known good value. If the measurements match, the Measuring service is launched. Else the
launch is denied. The Measuring Service’s measurement is extended to PCR 19.
Measuring and Attesting of the Target VM Measuring Service uses hypercalls to access
the Target VM. When a Measuring Service requests access to the Target VM state, the
ACPM verifies if the Measuring Service has necessary permissions or not. If the Measuring
Service has necessary permission, the Measuring Service is allowed to access the necessary
memory pages and perform appropriate measurement. The Measuring Service will then
report the measurement of the Target VM to the hypervisor through the toolstack API. The
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hypervisor extends the measurement to the TPM’s PCR 23.
To attest the target VM, the verifier would require the complete state of the system.
The measurements of the platform and hypervisor will ensure that the system is indeed
running in a trusted environment and thus the target VM’s measurement is trustworthy.
The verifier will request a quote from the TPM. The TPM will send a quote containing
all the necessary PCR values and this quote is signed by TPM’s Attestation Identity Key
(AIK). The verifier will verify that the quote has indeed come from the appropriate TPM
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Figure 4.5. Radium Prototype
In this section we describe the details of the prototype, on which we implemented a
trusted root-kit detector, that uses Radium. None of the available commodity hypervisors
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have all the necessary features ideal for Radium architecture. To demonstrate the capabilities
of our architecture, we have built a limited prototype using Xen hypervisor.
Xen hypervisor has all the necessary functional requirements. However it has larger
TCB and not-so-minimal hypercall interface. The modular architecture of Xen is more
suitable than other type-1 bare metal hypervisors for the Radium architecture. This modular
architecture of Xen separates all the management responsibilities of the hypervisor to a
special control domain called Dom0. The Dom0 provides necessary drivers to interact with
the hardware on behalf of the Xen hypervisor. Dom0 is essentially an extension of the
hypervisor.
As shown in the Figure 4.5, the ARTM in the prototype consists of trusted hard-
ware, trusted hypervisor and the control domain (Dom0). As ARTM is asynchronous the
untrusted environment can be used anytime for a security critical application. But whenever
the untrusted environment is to be used, the measuring service is invoked and the it mea-
sures the untrusted environment. If the measurements match a known state, the untrusted
environment is trusted for usage.
In our prototype, we used Ubuntu 12.04 LTS for the Dom0 and another Ubuntu
12.04 LTS for Measuring Service DomU. The Target VM is built using Ubuntu 10.04 and is
infected with kbeast [73] rootkit. The hardware used is an 4th Generation Intel i5 processor
with VT-x, VT-d and Intel TXT (Intel’s DRTM implementation) enabled. The working of
the prototype is discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.5.1. Boot-up
The Xen hypervisor is booted with DRTM. This ensures that we are booting the
hypervisor into a known trusted state. After BIOS has finished POST and the control is
transferred to the boot loader, the boot loader (tboot [38] in our case) invokes the special
DRTM instructions, GETSEC[SENTER] with Xen’s kernel address as parameter. This will
measure and load the Intel’s SINIT ACM only if the SINIT ACM’s digital signature is veri-
fied. The SINIT ACM will verify the TXT hardware and starts preparing the environment
for measured launch. The Xen kernel is measured and the hash is compared to a known
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value. If the Xen is proven to be unmodified, the VT-d protections are enabled to create
an isolated environment. With these protections in place, the Xen kernel is loaded into the
memory and the control is given to the Xen.
4.5.2. Protecting Confidentiality of Measuring Service
To ensure the confidentiality of the measuring service we encrypted it using a secret
key created in the Dom0. This encryption key is sealed in the TPM with the known hy-
pervisor state, i.e., the known good state of the Xen. The measurements for this DRTM
environment are stored in the PCRs 17 and 18. Hence we use these PCRs in our sealing
operation shown in the following command.
tpm sealdata -z -i secret.key -o ./secret.blob -p17 -p18
4.5.3. Launching a Measuring Service
Whenever we want to launch the Measuring Service, we have to unseal the key and
decrypt the measuring service. The key will be unsealed only if the platform is in the known
good state with correct values of PCR 17 and 18. This is done using the unsealing operation
shown in the following command.
tpm unsealdata -i ./secret.blob -o secret.key -z
If the platform is not in a known good state, the secret key will not be unsealed and the
trusted launch will be aborted. If the platform is in a known good state, the Measuring
Service is measured and launched. This measurement is stored in PCR 19.
All the measurements in this prototype use the physical TPM, which means that only
one measuring service can execute at any point of time. Alternatively virtualized TPM [144]
which allows each measuring service to have its own set of PCRs in a vTPM, can be used.
This will allow different measuring services to measure different target VMs concurrently.
4.5.4. Measuring the Target VM:
Radium allows feature rich measurement of applications with greater semantic knowl-
edge of the measured environments as compared to the DRTM environments. In our pro-
totype, we used root-kit detection as an example. The measured environment has been
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infected with kbeast rootkit. kbeast is a stealthy rootkit which uses system call hooks
and hides its presence. Even though it has a module inserted in the kernel and a Trojan
process running, these are never reported by the operating system. We detect this module
and Trojan process’ presence using the trusted root-kit detector (measuring service).
The memory of all the DomUs are isolated in separate address spaces by Xen. In
order for the measuring service to introspect the target VM, measuring service needs to
have access to the memory pages of the untrusted environment. To enable this, we provide
necessary policy rules. Xen has an inbuilt Mandatory Access Control mechanism known as
Xen Security Modules (XSM). XSM is an integral part of Xen and administers all interactions
between the VMs (environments). Each VM is addressed by a security label in XSM. This
label is setup through the policy configuration file. To enable the measuring service access
the memory pages of untrusted environment, we need to write necessary policy rules. The
XSM policy rules allow us to write rules with hypercall level granularity. We can define
what hypercalls each environment can execute. With necessary labels and policy rules the
measuring service will be capable of measuring the target VM.
The measuring service will invoke a hypercall asking a copy of the necessary memory
pages of the untrusted environment. The ACPM will then check if the policy permits the
measuring service to access the requested memory pages. If the policy permits, the hypervisor
will give access to necessary pages to the measuring service. The measuring service will read
all the necessary pages. In the case of rootkit detector, the measuring service accessed all the
necessary kernel pages. Then we use volatility [142] to walk through these kernel pages
to detect the hidden module and process. The following command is used to list hidden
modules in the untrusted world and happens in real time.
vol.py -l vmi://TargetVM --profile=ubuntu linux check modules
The volatility accesses the libVMI link to the target VM’s memory and the profile (type of
Operating System), executes the given command. We have used linux check modules to
list all the hidden modules in the kernel at the moment the analysis is being performed.
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4.5.5. Attesting the Verification:
After the root-kit detector introspects the untrusted environment, the result will be
saved to the TPM. The measuring service will handover the measurement to the hypervisor
to write it in the TPM. In our prototype example, we used PCR 23 for this. The PCRs 17,
18, 19 and 23 form the final state of the platform after root-kit detection. A remote party
can verify the result of the root-kit detection by requesting a quote. The TPM can send a
quote containing valued of the PCRs 17, 18, 19 and 23. With these values the verifier can
perform trusted verification if the root-kit detector has run in a known good state inside a
measured environment and what is the result of the root-kit detection.
4.6. Performance Analysis
In traditional trusted computing solutions we either reboot or reset the entire the
system to bring up a MLE. We have identified performance critical phases in these solutions
and we aligned these performance critical phases of Radium and measured the times taken
for each of these phases.
The four performance critical phases in traditional trusted computing solutions are 1.
Measurement time of the Target VM 2. Launch time of the Target VM (happens during boot
time or reset) 3. PCR Extend operation and 4. Quote operation. In Radium architecture
the measurement of Target VM is performed by the Measuring Service and the Target
VM will not be reset or reboot. However to guarantee that the measuring service is an
unmodified known-good-version, we launch the Measuring Service every time we want to
measure the Target VM. Hence the launch and boot times of the Target VM in traditional
trusted computing solution is replaced by the launch time and boot time of the measuring
service.
The performance critical phases in Radium are 1. Time taken to measure the Mea-
suring Service VM 2. Launch time of the Measuring Service VM 3. Measurement time of
the Target VM 4. PCR Extend operation and 5. Quote operation. Out of these the TPM
operations, extend and quote are present in both the solutions and these times are not
incurred by Radium itself.
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We have noticed that it takes an average of 26.7 seconds for measuring Target VM
with SHA1 hash and an average of 35.8 seconds for booting the Target VM. Making it an
average of 62.5 seconds to ensure trustworthiness of the Target VM in traditional trusted
computing solutions. In Radium we measured, on an average, 27.3 seconds to measure the
measuring service, 11.1 seconds to boot the measuring service and 1.7 seconds to measure
the Target VM. Making it a total of 40.1 seconds. These measurements are dependent on
the size of the Target VM image, Measuring service image and number of services running
in the Target VM. Services in Measuring Service VM are minimal and it is possible to make
a single application virtual machine images with no unnecessary services as shown in [86].
Two key take aways from this analysis are: In the traditional trusted computing
solution the Target VM has to be suspended for around 62.5 seconds and reset to the initial
state. There is no down-time for the Target VM in Radium, as the Measuring Service
can perform live measurements in real-time. Also, the traditional TC solutions have to
measure the entire Target VM image for verifying its trustworthy state, which takes around
27 seconds. Whereas in Radium, the Measuring Service reads only necessary memory pages,
which for rootkit detection, has taken less than 2 seconds.
4.7. Security Analysis
Radium architecture derives security from the hardware mechanisms. Radium uses
TPM and DRTM features to provide trust, isolation, and security for its components. In
this section we will describe how Radium provides security for each of its components. In
the Table 4.1 we compare how various Trusted Computing (TC) solutions compare with
Radium in providing security to various components.
4.7.1. Hardware
Any attack at the hardware level is difficult to detect and prevent. Various offline
attacks on the hardware described in the Section 4.3 will not be detected by Radium or any
other TC solution. These attacks are transparent to and happen outside Radium’s control.
When the system is offline, Radium is not executing and it has no way to know that the
59
Table 4.1. Comparison table of various trusted computing solutions
Attack Target
TC Solution
Hardware Hypervisor Target VM Trusted Service
Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online Offline Online
SRTM No Yes Yes No Yes No No No
DRTM No Yes Yes No Yes No No No
Other TC Solutions (Flicker, TrustVisor etc.) No Yes Yes No No No No Yes
Radium No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
attack is happening and hence cannot detect or protect itself from the attacks. Thus we
include the CPU, TPM and the Hypervisor in our Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and
assume they are not altered. While the system is online, an attacker may attach certain
devices to the hardware and leak information. However leaking this information alone will
not alter the system behavior. Even the leaked TPM measurements will be of little help to
an attacker. The DRTM measurements are initiated by hardware with a single thread of
execution. Any tampering to the software state will be detected by the Radium.
4.7.2. Hypervisor
Hypervisor is the most privileged layer of software in Radium’s architecture control-
ling all other components. An attacker can attack the binary of the hypervisor when the
system is offline. This attack will be detected when the hypervisor is launched at the system
boot and the DRTM measurements of the hypervsior will change with a changed binary.
The online attacks on the hypervisor comes through various interfaces the hypervisor ex-
poses for other components to interact with it, like hypercalls and API calls. An attacker
may run a target VM or trusted service on the hypervisor and use it to attack the hypervisor.
The minimal hypercall interface in the Radium’s hypervisor will decrease the attack surface.
The ACPM will limit what hypercalls a target VM or trusted service can invoke and thus
prevents from malicious VMs or services attacking the hypervisor. The trusted hypervisor




Target VM is any VM that is not trusted and typically used to run user applications.
These applications may sometimes need to perform security sensitive operations and deal
with security sensitive data. An attacker would try to attack the target VM image while it
is offline and change the application binary so that it may leak sensitive data. Radium uses
Trusted measuring service to measure the target VM state right before it is being considered
for a security sensitive operation. the measuring service would assess the state of the target
VM and can detect any alteration or manipulation to its state. While the target VM is
online, the attacker can use other VMs or trusted services to launch attacks via inter-VM
communication. Radium uses ACPM to prevent any such attacks as it allows only permitted
VMs talk to the target VMs through the inter-VM channel.
4.7.4. Trusted Service
A trusted service is a VM used to provide trusted services like measuring service.
Being a VM it is subject to the same attacks as the target VM. When, offline the VM image
can be attacked. But trusted service VM images are protected using encryption. And the
encryption key is sealed with the TPM. The key will be unlocked only when the system (the
hardware and the hypervisor) is in a known good state. All trusted services are invoked via
measured launch. A trusted service will only be launched if the measurement of the trusted
service matches a known good value. If not, the launch will be aborted. When the trusted
service is online, it is protected by the Radium’s ACPM policy.
4.8. Summary
As users and enterprises entrust more and more sensitive data and functionality to
computing platforms, from handheld devices to servers, the trustworthiness of the system
becomes a central problem. Numerous academic studies have presented how trusted systems
and trusted execution environments can be created and used. However, existing solutions
suffer from the TOCTTOU race condition. They often sacrifice performance and/or func-
tionality of the trusted and measured environments. In this chapter we proposed a novel
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Race-free On-demand Integrity Measurement Architecture (Radium) that addresses these
significant limitations. Radium allows feature rich on-demand measurement of applications
with greater semantic knowledge of the measured environments as compared to the SRT-




ONTOLOGY BASED VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT FOR CLOUD
COMPUTING1
5.1. Introduction
In Chapter 4, we have studied how we can provide on-demand trust guaranteed for
applications running in the virtualized and cloud environments. To keep up with the vulner-
abilities in the software stack, we need to have robust vulnerability management program.
In this chapter, we will present a novel technique to manage vulnerabilites using Ontolo-
gies and then demonstrate how the Ontology Vulnerability database can be instrumental for
managing vulnerabilities in a cloud computing scenario.
Security vulnerabilities are prevalent across all facets of software. The vulnerabilities
are increasing every year at an exponential rate. Our experience with software engineering
shows it is very difficult, even impossible, to build software without vulnerabilities, because
of the complexity of modern software systems. So the only way to deal with vulnerabilities is
find them and patch them. Discovering and patching vulnerabilities is not an easy task. To
deal with this complex vulnerability management, we need standard and efficient methods
and tools.
The first step to deal with vulnerabilities is classifying them. Vulnerability classifica-
tion is a well-studied area in computer security. Many vulnerability classifications have been
proposed and devised. Most of them have chosen the taxonomy [30] approach to classify vul-
nerabilities; however, many of these classifications have proven to be inefficient, incomplete
or erroneous. In taxonomy based classification the elements being classified are divided into
groups and sub-groups (hierarchy). Hence the taxonomy approach requires assigning vul-
nerabilities to one and only one sub-group. But many times vulnerability would be present
in more than one sub group. This can be due to incomplete and/or incorrect definition of
1Majority of this chapter has been previously published from S. Kotikela, K. Kavi, M. Gomathisankaran,
The 2012 International Conference on Security & Management (SAM 2012) 67-73. Reproduced with per-
mission from CSREA Press
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the vulnerability or the subgroup. It has been observed that this situation arises due to the
nature of vulnerabilities themselves [96] [59].
Vulnerabilities are concepts, not entities themselves. It is natural for them to overlap
across different groups. Ontologies are better suited than taxonomies to model concepts.
Ontology [155] is a knowledge representation technique which is used to model real-world
concepts and their relationships [37]. It is one of the prominent techniques used to model
and share a domain specific knowledge in the field of information science. Ontologies are
widely used in artificial intelligence, semantic web, and library science where classification
of concepts is very essential. These properties of ontologies make them perfect candidate
for vulnerability classification. A rich collection of existing tools and frameworks will make
creating ontology based vulnerability classification easy and efficient. The structured nature
of ontologies makes it easy to reason, query and infer. These features of ontologies have led
to adoption of ontologies in many security solutions such as [137] [61] [18] [112].
As Cloud Computing [43] continues to expand and evolve, it is influencing the way we
think about computing. Every aspect of computing is now connected to cloud computing.
It is a big game changer across all verticals of computing. This demands a lot of attention
and research for cloud computing. The Cloud Security Alliance had mentioned that security
is one of the biggest roadblocks in adopting cloud computing. As many businesses and users
are adopting and using cloud, there will be lot of software running in the cloud. Vulnerability
management is still relatively new. This makes the problem even more interesting [151] with
respect to cloud computing.
In this chapter we present a solution for vulnerability management in cloud envi-
ronments. Our solution uses well defined ontologies. The proposed framework consists of
Ontological Vulnerability Database, Semantic Natural Language Processor and Attack Code
Database. We designed an ontology by extending the Ontology for Vulnerability Manage-
ment (OVM). Then we designed a framework around the ontology and created an Ontological
Vulnerability Database (OVDB) which has semantic collection of vulnerabilities. The OVDB
is linked to an attack script database in which there is a many-to-many mapping between
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vulnerabilities of the OVDB and scripts of the attack script database. The attack script
database is a collection of attack scripts which will invoke runnable attack code from the
attack code database. The attack code database is compilation of attack codes from pop-
ular attack codebase like Metasploit. This attack database can be used to launch attacks
on applications to test for the associated vulnerability. A natural language processor will
facilitate natural language and keyword search on the OVDB. The semantic nature of the
ontologies will facilitate the reasoning and inferences on the OVDB. The framework facili-
tates vulnerability scanning and vulnerability assessment of an application. This work can
be further expanded to assess the runtime environment by extending the ontology to include
configurations of the environment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follow. Section 5.2 outlays some background
concepts related to our work. Section 5.3 describes the Related Work. Section 5.5.3 explains
the various Ontologies. Section 5.4 explains the architecture of our proposed framework.
Section 5.5 presents the Implementation of our framework followed by the Future Work in
Section 5.9 and Summary in Section 5.10.
5.2. Background
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): CVE [3] is a publicly available listing
of vulnerabilities and exposures in software systems. This project is initiated and main-
tained by MITRE organization. CVE doesn’t attempt to classify the vulnerabilities. It just
enumerates all the vulnerabilities. Every vulnerability in CVE has a unique identifier, de-
scription and list of software systems along with corresponding versions that are affected by
this vulnerability. This public repository helps many other vulnerability research projects.
The CVE project started by the MITRE organization now lies at the core of many securi-
ty/vulnerability research projects. Our framework also depends directly on CVE repository
at its lowest level; however, there are many refined layers available on top of CVE, such as
NVD. We will be using them than the raw CVE format.
Ontologies are at the heart of our research and many vulnerability assessment projects.
In this section we will provide brief introduction about ontologies. Ontology is defined as “A
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formal explicit description of concepts in a domain of discourse, properties of each concept
describing various features and attributes of the concept, and restrictions on properties. On-
tology is a conceptualization of a domain of interest”. It consists of concepts, relationships
between these concepts and rules specifying the limitations of these relationships. The con-
cepts from the real world are modelled as classes in ontology. The members of these classes
can be individuals (real-world-objects) or other classes or a combination of both. The prop-
erties model various attributes of the individuals or the properties of the classes in general.
Properties are also used to model relationships between two individuals or classes.
Ontologies are expressed in ontology languages. OWL [143] is the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) standard for representing ontology. OWL stands for Web Ontology
Language. There are 3 sublanguages for OWL: OWL-Lite, OWL-DL and OWL-Full. The
three languages differ in their expressiveness.
OWL-Lite is the simplest of the three. It is used where simple hierarchy and simple
constraints are sufficient. It is easy to build ontology in OWL-lite and it is the best choice
to migrate an existing taxonomy/hierarchy to an ontology using OWL-Lite.
OWL-DL is based on Description Logics (DL) and is more expressive than the OWL-
Lite. The inclusion of DL in OWL can be exploited for automated reasoning due to the First
Order Logic properties. It is also the most used OWL variant by many researchers.
OWL-Full is required for situations where high expressiveness is desired. It is to
be chosen when high expressiveness is more essential than decidability or computational
completeness of the language. OWL-Full cannot be used for automated reasoning.
5.3. Related Work
Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP [9] is a suite of interoperable
specifications for automating security management. SCAP is a standard developed by NIST
along with community participation. By using SCAP protocol to build a security solution
will ensure that a security solution will be interoperable with other related security solu-
tions. Our proposed OVDB framework is SCAP compliant. SCAP is essential for bringing































Figure 5.1. Vulnerability Assessment Framework
facto standard for achieving inter-operability between various security automation projects.
Hence we also align our ontology with SCAP so that we can leverage existing fine works that
are SCAP compliant and also ensure that our framework interoperable with other similar
initiatives and projects.
National Vulnerability Database (NVD): NVD [7] is a SCAP compliant vulnerability
database maintained by NIST. It is essentially the SCAP compliant version of the CVE
enumeration. The NVD database is released as NVD feeds in XML format. This NVD
database is used as an input for the OVDB creation. NVD is a refined version of CVE. It
has all the CVE data and in a SCAP compliant format, hence using NVD makes security
solutions more robust and more interoperable. In the same light we also use the NVD
database as a source for our Ontological Vulnerability Database.
Ontology for Vulnerability Management (OVM): OVM [147] is ontology for manag-
ing vulnerabilities. Ontologies are more suitable to model vulnerabilities than taxonomies
[96]. OVM uses ontology to store, classify and refer to vulnerabilities mapped from the
NVD vulnerabilities list. OVM can be used to store and retrieve vulnerabilities. It can be
queried using SWRL (Semantic Web Rule Language) through which we can perform seman-
tic comparisons between two related products. OVM is the precursor for OVDB. Though
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both the databases share many similarities, OVDB is modified to consist only concrete and
dis-ambiguous components and is intended to apply for cloud computing use-cases also.
OVM Software Assessment Tool (OSAT): OSAT [148] is an ontology based software
assessment tool. It is built on top of OVM. It uses all the vulnerability information present
in OVM and tries to measure the security of software applications. It uses the CVSS scores
of each vulnerability present in NVD and computes total security measure for particular
software using a formula which sums up the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
scores of all the vulnerabilities present in that software. OSAT is really useful tool and one
of the first of its kind. It quantifies vulnerability assessment. Our Vulnerability Assessment
framework is also similar to OSAT and has some interesting improvements like more user-
friendly search.
Ontology Of Cybersecurity Operational Information: Is an ontology [130] developed
for identifying cybersecurity information in cloud computing. The basis of the ontology is
derived by applying cybersecurity operations that are prevalent in regular non cloud com-
puting environments and applying them to cloud computing. The set of operations identified
are generalized out of the cybersecurity operations performed by various cybersecurity prac-
titioners in USA, Japan and Korea. Ontology of Cybersecurity Operational Information is
Cloud agnostic and aims at assessing the cloud environment for vulnerability assessment.
In future OVDB is going to combine the OVDB (which targets application vulnerability)
with the Ontology of Cybersecurity Operational Information to create a complete end-to-end
cloud vulnerability assessment.
Cyber Security Knowledge Graphs By leveraging the Cyber Security knowledge bases,
it is possible to construct knowledge graphs [70]. Knowledge graphs are essentially knowl-
edge bases focused on pragmatic implementation, querying, and correlation as opposed to
capturing and exchanging domain knowledge. Utilizing the semantic interconnections, huge
networks of data modeled as graphs, can be connected and queried from various perspec-
tives [106] to provide reactive and proactive cyber-resilience. Furthermore, knowledge graphs
can provide real-time insights into the highly connected data utilizing auto inferencing [149].
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Figure 5.2. OVDB Ontology
5.4. Vulnerability Analysis Framework
In this section we will present major components of our framework followed by an
algorithm.
Our Vulnerability Analysis Framework consists of Semantic Natural Language Pro-
cessor (SNLP), Ontological Vulnerability Database (OVDB), Attack Scripts Database, and
Attack Code Database.
Semantic Natural Language Processor (SNLP): The semantic capabilities of OWL
ontology aids in performing semantic reasoning on the ontological vulnerability database
(OVDB). The user enters generic or specific information about his application and the SNLP
is responsible to search through the OVDB and pull out the vulnerabilities that match user’s
keywords. Certain keywords by the user can be used to reason semantically than just perform
a keyword search/match. The SNLP is capable of performing both keyword search as well
as semantic search.
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Ontological Vulnerability Database (OVDB): OVDB is ontology database of vulnera-
bilities listed in the National Vulnerability Database. The OVDB includes lot of additional
information about vulnerabilities like consequences, countermeasures, attacks that reveal a
particular vulnerability etc. The ontology for OVDB is a modified version of the ontology
found in OVM. There is a one-to-one mapping between OVDB and Attack Scripts database.
Attack Scripts Database: Attack Scripts Database is a collection of scripts which can
invoke attacks from the attack code database. The scripts are customized for each attack
individually as the parameters required can vary greatly for each attack. The scripts are
mapped and a link to the script is stored along with associated vulnerability in the OVDB.
Attack Code Database: Attack Code Database is a database of attack codes primarily
taken from Metasploit. The scripts in the attacks scripts database invoke the code in this
database. This code will receive the parameters from the attack script and launches attacks
on the application.
Algorithm 2 Working algorithm of OVDB framework
1: User enters keywords for the search
2: SNLP processes the user query and displays list of related vulnerabilities
3: User selects the vulnerabilities he wants to test the application for
4: User launches associated attacks for the vulnerabilities selected
5: Attacks are performed on user’s application
6: A summary of attack results is posted for the user
The usage of the framework has been explained in Algorithm 2. The vulnerability
assessment starts by user typing in the keywords which describe the application that is to
be tested. This user query is submitted to the SNLP module. SNLP dissects the query and
fetches various vulnerabilities related to the given keywords. These vulnerabilities will have
a unique identifier (CVE-ID), brief description, impact score and a check box and launch
attack button. After the user selected all the vulnerabilities he want to test, he can click
Launch Attack button. This will invoke the associated attack script(s) from the attack-script
database. The attack scripts will invoke necessary attack code from the attack code database.
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Figure 5.3. OVDB Framework Search Page
After all the selected vulnerabilities are tested, the user is presented with an analysis of what
vulnerabilities have been tested positive and what have been tested negative.
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5.5. Framework Implementation
The framework we propose is built on top of the existing state-of-art vulnerability
assessment solutions such as OVM and OSAT and extends them with subtle modifications.
Hence, to understand our framework, one will need a good understanding of OVM and
OSAT.
5.5.1. OVM and OSAT
OVM is a vulnerability database (populated using NVD) which has a query interface.
OVM can be queried using standard query language SWRL [107]. These queries go through
the OVM and pulls out vulnerability information. An user can write queries and infer results
very efficiently with SWRL. For example, if a user is looking for vulnerabilities in browsers,
he doesn’t have to perform his search for each browser individually. Instead, he can issue
search terms querying to look up for vulnerabilities associated with applications like Firefox.
The reasoner will automatically infer which applications in the database fall in the category
(browser) as Firefox and pulls out all the vulnerabilities in those applications. SWRL is
a robust and expressive language which allows users to perform customized and efficient
queries according to their needs.
OSAT is a Security Assessment tool built on top of OVM. OSAT takes advantage of all
the ontological properties of OVM and reports comprehensive and qualitative measurements
of security. As the OVM, OSAT also follows the SCAP protocol. OSAT populates its reports
from the OVM data. With OSAT we can enter a software product and ask the tool to list
it’s vulnerabilities. Alternatively we can provide input such as type of vulnerability, scope
of the effect and nature of the vulnerability etc. Depending on user’s input the OSAT infers
the OVM database and builds a report of the vulnerability information. We can also ask
the OSAT to find similar software along with security scores. This feature will allow us to
compare which software product is more secure in a given product line.
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5.5.2. OVDB Framework
Both OVM and OSAT are pioneering projects which have shown the power of using
ontologies for vulnerability management. We build our OVDB vulnerability assessment
framework as an extension to the ideas of OVM and OSAT. OVM and OSAT have reasoning
and reporting which is limited to the applications in the database. They cannot be used for
user created applications. OVM and OSAT reports details from the database depending on
the user query.
These two tools report the vulnerabilities listed in the database. They cannot analyze
the application and tell us what vulnerabilities are present in the application right now. This
makes these tools static in nature, where we can only look up existing information. The
OVDB framework aims at solving this problem. The framework includes an attack code
database which is mapped to the vulnerabilities in the OVDB. Whenever an user wants
to analyze his application, he will use the framework to search for vulnerabilities. The
search module will report possible vulnerabilities. User can select and launch attacks to test
corresponding vulnerabilities. This is explained in more detail below.
5.5.3. Ontology
We have developed an ontology for implementing OVDB. It is a modified and extended
version of OVM. Figure 5.2 shows the various entities and their relationships between them.
We have developed this ontology in Protégé(ontology editor) [12] . All the concepts in the
ontology are derived from Thing (a generic entity signifying every child entity is thing). At
the top we have a wrapper entity for our ontology, called the OVDB Entity which signifies
that every child entity belongs to OVDB framework. Vulnerability is at the centre of the
ontology. It has relations with other entities like IT Product, Countermeasure, Consequence,
CVSS Metrics, Attack and Attacker. The relationship of the Vulnerability with these entities
is described below:
Consequence signifies that every vulnerability has a consequence. Having this in-
formation associated with the vulnerability helps us to search vulnerabilities using their
consequence. Many normal users may not technically classify a vulnerability, but they can
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identify the consequence and use it for searching the vulnerabilities.
Countermeasure entity contains the countermeasure for a vulnerability. It gives in-
formation on how to patch the associated vulnerability. This information will help users to
patch their software and get rid of the vulnerability.
CVSS Metrics is the set of CVSS metrics for a particular vulnerability. Which is a
standard measurement for the severity of the vulnerability. It also tells which of the security
properties of the information (confidentiality, integrity, availability) is being effected by the
vulnerability.
IT Product is the class of IT Products which have a particular vulnerability. This
relation helps us to find vulnerabilities not only within the application but also the complete
application stack. For e.g. if we are testing a Java Enterprise Application running in an
application server, we can give the details of the application server to get the list of possible
vulnerabilities in the application stack.
Attacker is the entity which is interested in exploiting the associated vulnerability.
Having information about attacker will help to protect the application more efficiently.
Attack is the type of the attacks that can exploit a particular vulnerability. This
allows user the flexibility to search if a particular attack is possible on his application. This
relation will allow a quick evaluation of the application against dangerous attacks.
5.5.4. Working
Figure 5.3 shows a sample search results page. The user performs a search query
by giving keywords describing the application such as technology, framework, language etc.
(Java Vulnerabilities in the above example). The SNLP searches for the keywords in the
OVDB and reports a list of vulnerabilities that are matching the user’s keywords. User’s
keywords will be used for semantic search. After the search is done, the SNLP presents
user with a list of vulnerabilities. These results are pulled out of OVDB. There is a check
box after every vulnerability. The user can either choose some or all of the vulnerabilities
and launch attacks corresponding to these vulnerabilities. User can click on launch attack
button for every attack he wants to be performed upon the application. After the attacks
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are performed on the application a detailed report is generated on the security status of the
application.
5.6. Vulcan
We have further implemented our ontology model to perform vulnerability assessment
in cloud computing context (VULCAN2). VULCAN uses ontology for creating vulnerability
database and associates a vulnerability with one or more attack code snippets from the
attack database. For assessing vulnerabilities in a specific domain, like cloud computing
or mobile, we have organized our vulnerabilities into classes. In the following subsections
the various components of VULCAN Architecture are described in detail and followed by
working flow.
5.6.1. NVD
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [7] is a SCAP [9] compliant vulnerability
database. The NVD database collects vulnerability information from various interrelated
vulnerability databases like CVE [3], CWE [5], CPE [2], CVSS [4] etc. and compiles the
information into a single database. Every entry in the NVD database is identified by a
unique identifier. This identifier is referred to as CVE ID, which is an unique identifier
for each vulnerability in the CVE database. This is the same identifier used across various
other vulnerability databases mentioned above. A typical vulnerability entry in the NVD
database has the vulnerability identifier, description of the vulnerability, list of software and
their versions in which this vulnerability is found in, vulnerability severity score (CVSS)
etc. collected from appropriate vulnerability databases. These vulnerability databases are
industry standard databases maintained by MITRE. All the vulnerability information found
in these databases is contributed by volunteers across the industry. The SCAP compliance
of the NVD database makes it easy to inter-operate with other security tools and automate
security assessment. VULCAN uses NVD as the source to populate vulnerability information
into the ontology knowledge base.
2The Vulcan section will also appear in the co-designer, Patrick Kamongi’s (UNT) dissertation, “Ontology
Based Security Threat Assessment and Mitigation for Cloud Systems - December 2018”
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Figure 5.4. Vulcan Architecture
5.6.2. OKB
Ontology Knowledge Base is the ontological database of vulnerability information
from the NVD database. NVD provides the vulnerability database in a XML feed. We
extract the vulnerability information from the XML feed and populate ontology knowledge
base. The vulnerability information in the NVD XML feed is present in various tags. All
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the information in these tags are mapped to various classes and properties defined in the
ontology.
5.6.3. System Classifiers
System Classifiers are dynamic inputs provided to the Indexer which will classify the
classes in the ontology knowledge base. An example classification includes various vendors
in the cloud computing domain and various software or hardware components in each service
level of cloud computing services. As shown in Fig. 5.4, cloud computing domain is classified
into IaaS, PaaS, SaaS etc. sub domains. In each of these domains we will include software
and hardware components used in popular cloud computing vendors like Xen hypervisor in
IaaS sub-domain, Google App Engine in PaaS sub-domain and Salesforce CRM in SaaS sub-
domain. We can provide the system classifiers to whatever detail and depth we want to. The
indexer takes these system classifiers as input and crawls through the ontology knowledge
base and creates an index. The index consists of vulnerabilities grouped according the system
classifiers provided by us. The changes in software or hardware in any domain or vendor
would require updating the system classifiers and re-indexing the ontology knowledge base.
5.6.4. Indexer
Indexer is the software responsible for crawling through the ontology knowledge base
an create an index. This index will in turn be used by the SNLP module to search the
ontology knowledge base depending on the user query. The indexer is set to run every time
the ontology knowledge base and/or system classifiers change. The indexer identifies all
the vulnerabilities that are related to software or hardware components listed in the system
classifiers and group them accordingly in the index.
5.6.5. Vulnerability Class Index
Vulnerability Class Index is the list of all vulnerabilities grouped into the categories
provided by the system classifiers. These groups are called as ”Vulnerability Classes”. Vul-
nerability classes will assist users to search for vulnerabilities within a specific domain or
sub-domain An example index looks like shown in the Fig. 5.4. At the top level there is
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cloud computing class. Cloud computing has a sub class called PaaS and the PaaS class has
Xen hypervisor as it’s sub class. In the Xen class we have list of vulnerabilities extracted by
the indexer from the ontology knowledge base.
5.6.6. SNLP
Semantic Natural Language Processor enables users to search and reason about vul-
nerabilities. It includes various sub components which are capable of doing pattern matching,
keyword search, and reason over properties and relationships of the classes in the ontology
knowledge base. SNLP takes input from user and tries to understand what the user is asking
for and provides him a list of vulnerabilities for the requested product and/or class. SNLP is
capable of looking up vulnerabilities for the requested product and listing vulnerabilities in a
particular class or product across various vendors. It also can reason and list vulnerabilities
for the technology or framework used in the user’s application.
5.7. Vulcan Working Flow
The NVD database consists of vulnerabilities identified by CVE ID and available as
a XML data-feed from NIST. The instances for each vulnerability will be populated using
XML parsing techniques. The entire XML data-feed is transformed into Ontology Knowledge
Base (OKB). The OKB has classes, properties for vulnerabilities and relationships between
these classes. This knowledge base with classes (and respective instances), relationships and
properties will enable us to perform semantic queries and reason about vulnerabilities.
After populating the OKB, we provide a dynamic set of classifiers to the indexer.
These classifiers are used to classify the vulnerabilities in the OKB. The indexer groups
various vulnerabilities into classes of a specific sub-domain viz cloud computing, mobile
computing etc. These classes help us to assess vulnerabilities of any application belonging to
one of these sub-domains. Theses classifiers can be modified when any software or hardware
component is modified in a particular sub-domain . For example, we may classify Xen
vulnerabilities in Cloud Computing → Amazon → IAAS → Hypervisor class as Amazon
uses Xen as the hypervisor. If in later point of time, Amazon decides to use KVM as
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hypervisor, we can update the classifiers accordingly. More details will be provided in the
implementation section.
Once these classifiers are provided, the indexer creates an index with classes for
the OKB. This index is referred by the SNLP module when a user performs a query. All
the vulnerabilities matching user’s application, technology and/or platform will be listed.
User can then choose what vulnerabilities (s)he wants to test. Once the user selects the
vulnerabilities he wants to test, necessary attacks are launched with the code from attack
database. The wrapper scripts for the attack codes will provide necessary meta-data such
as application path, necessary parameters. These attack scripts will launch attacks on the
application and test it for the chosen vulnerabilities.
All the vulnerabilities tested positive will be reported to the user along with a security
score based on the CVSS score. Necessary countermeasures will be provided if available. An
illustration of our working framework is shown in Fig. 5.5. The implementation details for
each component are detailed in the following section.
A typical use case scenario of using VULCAN components and modules to assess
vulnerabilities for an android device using Mercury Framework [50] goes like this:
(1) A User provides both dynamic inputs for example “Android” (this data is provided
to the System Classifiers module of our VULCAN framework), and a natural lan-
guage query for example “Assess for weaknesses that can allow an unauthorized
access to my device?” (this query is processed within our VULCAN Semantic Nat-
ural Language Processor - ’SNLP’).
(2) The System Classifiers generates possible android based solutions and feeds them
to the Indexer module. Then, the Indexer creates relevant vulnerabilities indexes
which are used to produce vulnerabilities groups from the Vulnerability Class Index
module. A sample created vulnerabilities group named “Root Access” contains
indexed data of these CVE-IDs: CVE-2011-3874, CVE-2011-1823 and CVE-2009-
2692.
































Figure 5.5. Vulcan Working
created vulnerabilities group data. It will return to the user via a dialogue agent
interface relevant results such as the IT Products that have vulnerabilities and other
necessary information that comply with the user query.
(4) Using our Middle-ware application, we map the IT Products to a Mercury frame-
work [50] module called “Test for vulnerabilities that allow a malicious application
to gain root access” to launch attacks on the products within our targeted android
user device.
(5) Then, VULCAN traces the deployment of the module payloads and report whether
the attacks were successful on the device or not and if the tested vulnerabilities are
still present or fixed for those IT Products.
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5.8. Vulcan Implementation
We have implemented our VULCAN via a set of interconnected components as de-
scribed above in the Architecture section. The main source vulnerability information for
our framework is provided by NVD. The NVD data is stored in a hierarchical database
which lacks reasoning on its data. In our implementation of OKB we extract NVD data
and store them in a graph database which is realized via Resource Description Framework
(RDF) triples. With our graph database we generate an ontology that enable us to do some
reasoning tasks which are useful for vulnerability assessment within our VULCAN.
To achieve a dynamic vulnerability assessment for Cloud Computing, we propose
three modules such as: System Classifiers, Indexer, and Vulnerability Class Index. Each
module depends on the other one as described in the Architecture section. In our SNLP im-
plementation, we rely on our Ontology Knowledge Base for information and the capabilities
of our modules to properly fetch the cloud computing relevant search results.
5.8.1. OKB
We defined a vulnerability ontology to model vulnerability information provided by
NVD. In our approach, we extended the ontology proposed in our previous work on Vulnera-
bility Assessment In Cloud Computing [79]. This new ontology in Fig. 5.6 is more expressive
in terms of new entities and relationships, we added a class (CloudType) and sub-classes to
help us model cloud environment and its types and also to model in the Software subclass
of ITProduct class which vulnerable programs are privileged or unprivileged. We imple-
mented this ontology in Protege [12] and the source code is available in our demonstration
set samples.
Ontology Knowledge Base (OKB) Implementation is completed via these two steps:
(1) Extraction of vulnerability information from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- XML data feed.
(2) Population of our ontology knowledge base (OKB).
(1) Extraction of vulnerability information from NVD - XML data source
(a) Parsing the NVD - XML data source
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Figure 5.6. High Level View of our Vulnerability Ontology Definition





(c) From the extracted Summary text, another extraction take place to retrieve
additional information (that
was not provided in any entry’s attribute of NVD) about this vulnerability
described in the Summary text.
such additional information are like:
(i) Who’s the attacker
(ii) What’s the attacker’s intent
(iii) What’s the attack mechanism
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(d) Map the CVE-ID extracted in (b) to our web search agents to retrieve additional
information about this
particular vulnerability. Such information are like:
(i) What is the attack (exploit)?
(ii) What is the consequence of the attack extracted in (c)?
(iii) What is the countermeasure of this attack (c)?
(2) Population of our OKB
(a) Using Protege-OWL editor [12], we first define our vulnerability ontology do-
main in terms of concepts (classes), roles(properties, relationships) and indi-
viduals [147].
(b) Then we populate our ontology to create a knowledge base of vulnerabilities.
We use these two adopted approaches:
(i) Manually extract relevant vulnerability information from NVD - data
source and use them to instantiate our ontology.
(ii) Using custom python script, we automatically extract relevant vulnera-
bility information as described in Step-1.
(c) Then we store them into a triple store database. This database will be used to
instantiate our ontology via Protege.
In the OKB process, we implemented our extractors using custom python scripts.
These extractors, they iteratively retrieve relevant vulnerability information from each NVD
entry. With the extracted data, we generate RDF triples using an RDFLIB [81] python
library. With that we populated our defined ontology automatically. For a small set of NVD
data entries, one can use Protege tool to achieve the same goal. By manually creating the
ontology instances. In Protege, the ontology population can be achieved either by adding
instances one at a time or by instantiating them using a backend database.
5.8.2. Modules
Our modules for the VULCAN implementation as illustrated in Fig. 5.7 are: System
















Figure 5.7. VULCAN Modules
5.8.2.1. System Classifiers
Our proposed approach for the system classifiers implementation is illustrated in our
modules Fig. 5.7. We are customizing an application of genetic algorithms that are more
adaptive to our dynamic inputs for cloud computing classification. Using the properties of
genetic algorithms of working on a population of possible solutions and being stochastic, we
rely on them on generating some classes that are then feed to our indexer module for further
processing.
5.8.2.2. Indexer
The indexer module application will use the feeds received from system classifiers
module to browse our vulnerability ontological knowledge base. As the module illustrates in
Fig. 5.7, our indexer application should repeatedly check for any new change in the provided
dynamic inputs and creates new indexes. Our goal for the implementation of this module
is to optimize speed and performance in finding relevant information for the SNLP search
queries.
We first collect the classes generated by the system classifiers, then use them to parse
our OKB component into groups that are related to the provided feeds. Then we store the
indexes as linked data. This approach will allow us to do inference on SNLP search results.
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5.8.2.3. Vulnerability Class Index
The indexes created by our indexer module, are further processing and listed into
vulnerability class groups as illustrated in Fig. 5.7. These groups reflect the cloud based
dynamic inputs received. Then, within our VULCAN framework, the SNLP component
uses these rich information about vulnerability for retrieving results for the relevant user
given query. The implementation of this module is straight forward, all it needs to point an
extractor to the indexed data and retrieve them as a list.
5.8.3. SNLP
Our Semantic Natural Language Processor engine enables users to search and reason
















Auto Generated Feedback N-Gram Feed
Figure 5.8. Vulcan Semantic Natural Language Processor
(1) pattern matching
(a) This technique helps us to identify any kind of pattern from the user input text.
We realize it using Regular Expression methods. Here we both do a keyword
search and reasoning, then formalize a suitable result to respond the user query.
(2) keyword search
(a) Queries protege plugin in [12] allows the user to query our vulnerability ontology
using a plain keyword, or by selecting a class (concept) or relationships name
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within our ontology. In addition to the search results, user to learn more about
related information via generated inline links.
(3) reasoning
(a) To reason with our ontology knowledge base stored in an owl file for example,
we use two methods. One method is by using the SWRL Protege plugin [107],
here the user enter the SWRL rules via an editor to reason about owl individuals
and to infer new knowledge about them. Another approach is to use Jess [6]
as the rule engine to achieve the same goal as the SWRL plugin does.
(b) Pellet [39] is one of the reasoner tool we could use for OWL-DL [8] reasoning
tasks.
(c) SPARQL query [11] allow us to query our RDF format ontology and perform
some reasoning tasks.
Our SNLP component as illustrated in Fig. 5.8 is a self-contained application that
allow the user to lively interact with a given system (in this case, our VULCAN) via a its
dialogue agent interface. Here, the user input a query which can be a formal one (like a
SPARQL query) or not. Then it is processed through our engine processor which run a
pattern matching, keyword search and reasoning tasks while generating partial results. A
formalized user query result is produced from one or a combination of the partial results.
This application is implemented using a similar approach as the intelligent personal assistant
and knowledge navigator system uses like in SIRI [10]. Here we interlock our OKB and
modules (System Classifiers, Indexer, and Vulnerability Class Index) together to support
our intelligent system. In order to be able to produce a reliable and relevant result of the
user’s query.
5.9. Future Work
In future we are planning to combine our ontology with the Ontology Of Cybersecu-
rity Operational Information to provide a more robust and complete security in the cloud.
The OVDB ontology primarily targets vulnerability of applications where as Ontology Of
Cybersecurity Operational Information targets vulnerabilities of the cloud environment it-
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self. Therefore, by combining these two ontologies we can achieve ontology for vulnerability
assessment of the entire cloud infrastructure (application and environment). Since these
two ontologies are cloud platform and application agnostic, we can perform vulnerability
assessment for any application in any cloud.
5.10. Summary
In this chapter we have proposed and successfully implemented an Ontological Frame-
work for Vulnerability assessment in cloud. The framework is capable of assessing the vul-
nerabilities in popular software as well as software created by users. The framework can
be installed in any cloud platform and used for assessing any technology applications. The
framework allows security professionals and as well normal users to search through the data-
base and assess the software. The framework is equipped with a nice user interface which
makes the searching of vulnerabilities very easy. The framework makes the tedious task of
vulnerability management and assessment easy and effective. With vulnerabilities growing
exponentially everyday, this framework will have a great use in present and future. As the
framework is built with the state-of-art security automation protocols, it is both automotive
and inter-operable with other applications.
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CHAPTER 6
SECURE AND TRUSTED EXECUTION FRAMEWORK
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 we have seen how to provide secure execution, provide on-
demand integrity measurements, and efficiently manage vulnerabilities using ontologies in
complex virtualized environments like Cloud Computing. In this chapter, we will see how
we can combine these techniques to provide holistic trust and security to the entire lifecycle
of workload execution.
6.1. Introduction
As modern day lives become more integrated with computing devices and services, we
need secure and trusted computing systems. This necessity becomes even more critical due to
the fact that most modern day information services involve remote data storage and remote
computation. This trend of remote data storage and remote computation has accelerated
due to:
(1) Advances in virtualization and related technologies.
(2) Widespread adoption of utility computing [34] delivered through the Cloud.
(3) Proliferation of mobile computing devices: smartphones, tablets, and laptops.
(4) Exponentially increasing IoT devices with limited resources.
These technologies and trends have improved the quality of life in general and made
the benefits of utility computing easily accessible to the world at large. Along with these
benefits come various challenges of trust and security. It is critical to ensure the security of
this data and trust the programs accessing this data. By providing this guarantee, we can
all take advantage of these technical solutions without the loss of data, services, and enable
trustworthy business.
In this chapter, we will present a secure and trusted execution framework to achieve
this goal. To provide holistic trust and security in a computing system, the framework offers
principles that will provide trust and security guarantees throughout the execution life cycle
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of the application. The framework is primarily designed and tested for virtualized environ-
ments with commodity PC hardware features. However, with the current proliferation of
virtualization, we are confident that this framework can be deployed in any infrastructure
and in any context.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 will discuss the goals
and design principles used for developing this framework. In Section 6.3, we will see the
recommended architecture for this framework. To discuss the viability of the framework,
Section 6.4 provides a detailed analysis of the framework and how it achieves the goals of
this framework. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the chapter with summary of contributions.
6.2. Overview
The primary objective of this framework is to ensure trust and security throughout
the execution of an application. In other words, to provide a secure and trusted execution
environment. We will be limiting our scope of security to confidentiality and integrity of the
application and any security sensitive data of the application. The trust guarantees provided
by the framework principles will apply to the infrastructure used to provide the execution
environment along with the application. These trust guarantees are to ensure that only
known, and by extension, trusted components are executing and providing the execution
environment for the application.
6.2.1. Goals
As mentioned previously, the overall objective of this framework is to provide trust
and security throughout the life-cycle of an application. An application’s life cycle can be
divided into three phases. If we can provide trust and security during these phases, we can
ensure the trust and security guarantees are intact throughout the lifecycle of an applications.
These phases and the goals are described below:
(1) At the time of launching the application:
We need to ensure that the application is launching in a trusted state. This would
mean that the application itself is in a known state, free from any known vulner-
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abilities, and is running in an environment that is in a known secure state. When
the environment is in a known state, it will have all the components responsible for
providing the execution in a trusted and verified state. To ensure that the environ-
ment is in a secure state, it should be free from any known vulnerabilities and also
prevent any other internal/external component from interfering with the launch of
the application.
(2) Any time during the execution of the application:
Once the application is launched in a secure and trusted state, it needs to continue
executing in the same state. This would be more challenging than providing trust
and security during the launch of an application because there will be more entities
interacting with the application while it is executing compared to when it is launch-
ing. To provide these guarantees we need to ensure that:
(a) The application is continuing to be in a trusted state, especially before per-
forming any security sensitive operations.
(b) All run-time interactions with the application are secure and the security
controls are enforced by trusted components.
(c) The execution environment remains in a trusted state.
To provide the trust and security in an application any time during the execution
of the application, we need to be able to fulfill these necessary conditions.
(3) At the time of updating the application:
Every application needs to be updated. It can be due to fixing the bugs, patch-
ing the vulnerabilities, or changing requirements. It is critical to ensure the trust
and security guarantees for an application during this process of updating the ap-
plication. It is important to note that when an application is being updated, the
known or trusted state of the application changes. Because of this, there may also
be changes in the application behavior and security requirements. Hence it is neces-
sary to update the security controls and trust monitors of the application to reflect




To ensure holistic trust and security for an application during its entire execution
lifecycle, the framework needs to be built over sound principles. These principles need to
be derived from tested and validated practices. To ensure the necessary trust and security
guarantees, our framework is designed on the basis of the principles learned from our previous
works [80, 78, 105, 79, 72]. These principles are:
(1) Only hardware can be implicitly trusted.
Due to the dynamic and flexible nature of the software, it cannot be immutable
and hence cannot be trusted implicitly. Hardware, when coupled with tamper-proof
Read Only Memory (ROM) can be trusted implicitly. Only such a hardware com-
ponent can be the initiator for the chain-of-trust. This property is the foundation
for having trusted execution environment.
(2) Trust can be extended from one entity to another entity.
It has been shown in the past research [132, 36, 66] that trust in one entity can
be extended to another entity. By extending the trust from one entity to another
entity, we can build a chain-of-trust that can provide the necessary environment for
executing an application in a trusted environment. Without this ability, we will
need to compose a system with implicitly trusted components. While this may be
feasible, such a system would be hard to build, test, and difficult to use.
(3) Trust is extended to another component from a measuring entity if the
measuring entity is trusted at the time of measurement.
While it is possible to extend trust from one entity to another entity, it is impor-
tant to follow the appropriate methodology. The trust from a measuring entity
to the measured entity is extended only if the measuring entity is trusted at the
time of measurement. Without this principle, the measuring entity itself will be
untrustworthy and by extension, its measurement. This is why we need to start the
chain-of-trust with an implicitly trusted entity.
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(4) Measurement process should be secure and tamper-proof.
The foundation for trust is measurement. Measuring an entity’s state and com-
paring it with a known trusted state will lead to trust in the application’s state
at the time of measurement. The process of measuring an entity and verifying the
trustworthiness of its state should be secure and tamper proof. This will prevent
malicious programs and actors spoofing incorrect measurements to wrongly trust
the application’s state.
(5) Measurements need to be stored in and reported by trusted hardware.
After securely measuring an entity, the measurement need to be stored in trusted
hardware. This will guarantee that the measurements will not be tampered with
for a later usage. A similarly trusted hardware should be used to report the mea-
surement to a remote or local verifier. After storing the measurement in the trusted
hardware, it needs to be ensured that the measurement is reported to the verifier in
a secure manner. This would include secure communication channel and protocols
for communicating with the verifier.
(6) All interactions between the trusted components need to be secure.
Once trust is established in various components, it is important to maintain the
trust. If these components don’t interact with any other entities and no other
entities interact with these components, the trust remains same. However, such a
system will not be practical to build and use. Any reasonably functional system’s
components will be interacting with each other. All such interactions need to be
secure to maintain the trustworthiness of the verified components.
(7) All components of the system need to be free from known vulnerabilities.
Even when a system is composed of entities in known trusted state and it is ensured
that all interactions with the components are secure, it would not guarantee that
the known states are secure by themselves. Also, it is not practical to know or
identify all weaknesses in the application at any given time, the best we can expect
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to do is to ensure that all components are free from known vulnerabilities, and in
doing so we can ensure the system is in the best possible secure and trusted state.
6.3. Architecture
In this section, we will present the proposed architecture of our framework and discuss
each component in detail. The framework is separated into layers to provide better visual-
ization and clarity on the functionality in each layer. Figure 6.1 shows the diagrammatic
representation of the architecture.
All trusted components are colored in Green and untrusted components are colored in
Red. All the components that are not directly part of the execution environment are colored
in Orange. Whenever there is a measurement by a trusted entity, such a measurement is
represented with Blue arrows. All other interactions and components are depicted with black
boxes or black lines.
6.3.1. Hardware Layer
The most important layer in the framework is the hardware layer. It provides the foun-
dation for trust and by extension, provides security guarantees for the rest of the framework.
It consists of hardware components necessary to provide the trusted and secure execution
environment.
6.3.1.1. Immutable Root of Trust for Measurement (IRTM)
IRTM is the key hardware component that provides the implicit trust to build the
chain-of-trust. As the name implies, it is immutable and consists of Read Only Memory
(ROM) and can be implicitly trusted. The ROM has code necessary for measuring the
next component in the chain-of-trust to be executed. The IRTM executes very early in the
system startup and validates all the firmware and system software to be executed. The IRTM
has direct access to the next components in the system’s memory or in another hardware
component and is secured by the platform. The platform ensures that no other software or
firmware is executing when IRTM is measuring. Due to this feature, IRTM should usually be
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Figure 6.1. Secure and Trusted Framework - Architecture
executing during the the system startup or rest. Also, such an isolated execution guarantees
the security of the measurement being performed.
6.3.1.2. Processing Subsystem
The Processing Subsystem consists of typical processing components: CPU, RAM,
and I/O Memory Unit.This subsystem is responsible for executing all the software com-
ponents, such as, hypervisor, operating system, and applications. There are no special
requirements for the processing subsystem. Any off the shelf commodity components would
suffice. However, it is necessary for them to provide modern virtualization features. CPU,
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Memory, and I/O virtualization.
6.3.1.3. Root of Trust for Storage and Reporting
With so many measurements being performed, we would need a trusted storage mech-
anism along with trusted reporting capabilities. It is ideal to implement these functions in
hardware rather than the software layer. This root-of-trust would allow any component in
the architecture to store measurements. While this flexibility may seem like a weakness,
it should not. Because all the trusted components only verify measurements performed by
them. Additionally, when the measurement is reported to the verifier, entire platform state
gets reported, including who performed the measurements. This will alleviate any concerns
of spoofing.
6.3.2. Control Layer
The next layer in the architecture is the control layer. This layer consists of a system
software, typically hypervisor or a microkernel [156, 62], capable of virtualizing operating
systems and applications. This layer has complete control over the underlying hardware layer
and can delegate access to the hardware resources to any component necessary. This layer
should ideally have a small codebase and is preferably formally verified. These constraints
will greatly reduce the security concerns and by extension, the need to verify the state of
the control layer software for every interaction.
Furthermore, the control layer will delegate most runtime operations to other compo-
nents and is only concerned about allocating resources and monitoring secure access control.
It uses the modern virtualization techniques for memory, CPU, and I/O virtualization to
achieve this. This greatly shrinks the attack surface during the runtime and the potential for
attacks. With this mechanism, we can continue to trust the control layer even for extended
times.
To maintain the security of the system, it is necessary to have an access control
mechanism. An access control mechanism should be present in the control layer to monitor
the interactions between the workloads. Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) [64, 63] is
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best suited for providing access control between the various components of this architecture.
ABAC would be able to take the current state of a component (as an attribute) to validate
whether the requested access can be granted or not.
Finally, the control layer provides security architectures for secure applications. These
security architectures are implemented by using modified virtual hardware [78, 105] to pro-
vide security features to the applications. These security features range from protecting
secure keys to integrity verification of the entire memory. At the same time, these archi-
tectures are capable of providing varying degrees of security at various granularities. The
smallest granularity that can be provided is one address location in the memory.
6.3.3. Service Layer
Next up in the stack is the Service Layer. Service layer consists of measuring services
used by control layer and the workloads. The service layer also consists of the workloads.
Workloads can be an operating system, or minimal kernel based applications like uniker-
nel [86], or simply applications [92] running in an isolated environment. All service layer
components are isolated by a trusted control layer.
Measuring services themselves are technically workloads executing on top of the con-
trol layer. Their functionality can be as basic as measuring the state of other workloads or
external entities like management services. Measuring services are basically agents of the
control layer and can be executed on demand to perform various measurements at any time.
All measuring services are brought up, managed, and brought down by the control
layer. These services are launched only after being verified by the control layer that they
are in a trusted state. These are usually ephemeral in nature and are brought up as and
when necessary. After they are launched, they only exist for providing a specific service and
interact with limited entities with limited functionality. All the additional capabilities and
control of accesses to and from the services are monitored by the access control mechanism
in the control layer.
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6.3.4. Management Layer
All applications and workloads will change through time. It can be due to changes in
the requirements or it can be due to newly discovered bugs and vulnerabilities. To manage
these changes effectively, the management layer provides necessary services. Management
layer is the most external layer in the architecture. It is not directly part of the execution
environment, but is necessary for maintaining the security of the execution of the workload.
Management layer will provide services external to the workload execution that can
detect, protect, and modify the workload. For performing any changes to the state of the
workload, a management layer service has to work with the measuring service. The mea-
suring service will ensure that the management service is trustworthy and the process of
the changing or updating a workload’s state is secure. The measuring service will also be
responsible for updating the access control rules to reflect these changes.
6.4. Analysis
In this section, we will present a detailed analysis of our framework. We are primarily
focused on the trust and security of the execution and hence will not discuss the performance
in terms of resource consumption. This section is discussed in 3 subsections. We will first
provide an analysis of the possible implementation of our architecture. Then we will deep
dive into the trust and security of the architecture. We will present how the trust and
security is provided in the 3 crucial stages of a workload’s execution. Lastly, we will discuss
the limitations and potential challenges to our proposed framework.
6.4.1. Implementation
A reference implementation is presented in Figure 6.2 which shows what technologies
and services are possible in our architecture. While existing technologies don’t exactly map
to the recommended specifications, we believe they can match the architecture in principle.
We will discuss how various components can be implemented with existing technologies and
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Figure 6.2. Secure and Trusted Framework - Implementation
6.4.1.1. Hardware Layer
The hardware layer has 3 main components. We believe all these 3 components
can be implemented using currently available commodity hardware. To provide IRTM, we
can reuse the existing CRTM in Intel [67] and AMD [127] platforms. These platforms
also provide instructions GETSEC[SENTER] and SKINIT respectively to provide an isolated
execution environment and launch the control layer. This isolation is achieved by pausing
all other threads of execution and only executing the control layer. The control layer can be
launched into a trusted state either at the time of boot or at any other time dynamically.
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With this ability to launch/reset the control layer into a trusted state at any time is extremely
necessary as the trust in the underlying trusted hardware will now be extended to the
control layer. And the control layer will proxy as the root-of-trust for performing dynamic
on-demand measurements for the remaining components in the system.
6.4.1.2. Control Layer
The control layer needs a system software capable of virtualizing the workloads. There
are few virtual machine monitors and microkernels that are capable of doing this. Some of the
microkernels are formally verified [76, 28] and are capable of running full operating systems,
driver domains, or applications. One research hypervisor is also formally verified [20] and it
has been proven that it is also possible to formally verify a regular hypervisor [82].
Due to other functionalities required to be performed by the control layer, we believe
a small, modular mainstream hypervisor like Xen [26] would be more ideal for current im-
plementation of our framework. Xen’s modular architecture allows us to run most of the
components in isolated address spaces [52] like driver domains. With this architecture, Xen
behaves more like a microkernel [62].
Along with modular architecture and strong isolation, xen also implements access
control mechanism modeled after widely used SeLinux [90]. With the presence of this access
control mechanism, Xen can ensure security during any interactions between the workloads.
This also allows xen to provide measuring services which are capable of performing measure-
ments with fine granularity.
6.4.1.3. Service Layer
As the measuring services are specialized workloads, designed for providing measure-
ments for the control layer and other workloads as necessary, they can be implemented by
customizing the workloads. For example, virtualization specific minimal os [101], uniker-
nels [87] or even applications with full blown operating system can be used to provide a
measuring service. If the measuring service has minimal TCB, it will have better perfor-
mance and security guarantees. Solutions like Qemu Lite PC [89], a virtual machine type
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optimized to run minimal operating systems in virtualized environments, are much better
suited for running the measuring services. The measuring services are themselves launched
after being verified by the control layer.
A wide variety of services can be implemented in the service layer. We will present
few key services that we have implemented in the Radium [80] architecture:
(1) Trusted Launch:
Trusted Launch measuring service is responsible for measuring the state of a work-
load image and launch only if it is in a trusted state. To measure the state of a
workload, we used the SHA256 hash of the workload (virtual machine) image and
verified it against a known good value of the workload.
(2) On-demand measurement:
After launching the workload, the on-demand measurement service is responsible for
performing anytime on-demand measurements to verify the state of the workload
dynamically. This would allow users to verify the state of the workload before
performing any security sensitive transaction.
(3) Malware detection:
We have also implemented a malware detection service. This service can detect if
the workload has been infected by a specific malware. Since the measuring services
can have access to the workload’s (guest) physical memory, we can perform the
measurement without depending on the workload’s operating system, if it has one.
We were successfully able to detect the kbeast [35]. This detection would have been
extremely difficult if performed from within the workload itself because kbeast is a
stealthy rootkit.
6.4.1.4. Management Layer
As previously discussed, the management layer consists of services that are necessary
to maintain the security of the workload’s execution. Vulnerability management is one such
service that is extremely important to ensure that the workload is secure. Robust vulnera-
bility management practice helps us to test the entire stack for any potential vulnerabilities
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that can threaten the security of the workload. We have implemented such a service in
Vulcan [72] extending our prior work OVDB [79]. Other potential services that can po-
tentially be implemented in the management layer are Patch Management and Identity &
Access Management (IAM). Patch management would work in tandem with the vulnerabil-
ity management and will be responsible for updating the workload to a more secure (less
vulnerable) state. IAM would be responsible for ensuring only authenticated users can only
access system components that they have authorization for.
6.4.2. Security and Trust
To analyze the security and trust provided by the proposed framework, we will discuss
security and trust in 3 phases of the workload’s execution. Before analyzing these three
phases, we need to be aware of what components are available and which of these components
are trustworthy. The hardware and control layers are present before any stages of the
workload execution begin.
The hardware layer is implicitly trusted.The hardware is responsible for launching
the trusted control layer. The original trust in the control layer is derived from the verified
launch by the trusted hardware (IRTM). After the IRTM measures and verifies that the
control layer software is in a known state, the control layer starts executing and assumes
control over the entire hardware. The trust in the security architectures is derived from
the trust in the control layer. While they logically appear in the control layer, they are to
be implemented as plugins or extensions to the control layer software. Through this, an
additional layer of isolation is achieved and core control layer software would be protected
from any security challenges against the security architectures themselves.
6.4.2.1. At the Time of Launch
Trust: A workload is always launched by the trusted control layer. The control layer
can use the verified launch measuring service to ensure that the workload is in a trusted state
as necessary. This ensures that only a trusted workload is launched. At the time of launch,
the hardware and control layers are completely trusted. An additional integrity verification
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of the control layer can be requested if necessary for the workload. This would guarantee
that the workload is launched into a verified trusted environment.
Security: The control layer will use advanced hardware virtualization features to
provide a securely isolated execution environment. Since this isolation is provided by a small
TCB code, it has The control layer’s access control policy prevents any other component to
interfere with the launch of the workload. Thus, the workload will be securely launched into
an isolated environment.
6.4.2.2. Any Time During the Execution
Trust: The control layer is primarily responsible for ensuring all the components that
are performing measurements or security sensitive operations are in a trusted state. While
the workload is executing, we may need to verify the trustworthiness of the workload before
performing any security sensitive transaction. For example, the workload need to be in a
trusted state before accessing DRM content. In such scenario, the state of the workload can
be reliably determined by the associated measuring service and access to the DRM content
will be provided only if the workload is in a trusted state.
Similarly, if the workload needs to send information only to a trusted component,
the component’s state will be verified before passing such information. For example, the
workload needs to send a sensitive transaction over the network interface only if the network
driver is trustworthy. It is important to note that the trust and security guarantees of the
framework are available only within the execution environment. Once the data passes the
execution environment (like a network packet in the above example) the trust and security
is dependent on the medium of transmission and the receiving endpoint.
Security: The workload’s runtime security is primarily provided by the access control
mechanism in the control layer and security architecture (if any is used by the workload).
The access control mechanism prevents any and all interactions with the workload from
other components. Especially the measuring services, as they can potentially have ability to
access the (guest) physical memory of the workload through the control layer.
The execution environment is secured as a whole unit by the access control mech-
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anism not the individual threads of execution within the workload. To have more finer
security features, the workload needs to rely on the security architecture. A workload can
have a custom security architecture built for itself or can use one of the existing security
architectures. By using a security architectures, the workload can request protection for the
security sensitive components at a page granularity. This facility is available even for an
application within the Operating System workloads. The security architecture can prevent
the unauthorized accesses from even the operating system or rootkits within the workload.
6.4.2.3. At the Time of Change/Update
Trust: Managing changes or updating the workload is another crucial operation
facilitated by the framework. A measuring service will mediate with the management services
to ensure that the workload is only interacting with trusted management services. This can
be performed by validating the digital certificate of the management service and validating
the state of the platform the management service is executing upon. Once the trust in the
management service is established, the workload will be permitted to initiate the update
process.
Security: Security of the updating process is as critical as the trust in the components
performing the update. The access control policy will be evaluating if the management
services have the necessary access to perform scans to ascertain if the workload needs an
update. Certain types of scans can be intrusive than the others. Relevant access control
policies need to be added to allow management services to perform necessary scans. Once the
management service ascertains the need the for an update, the access control policy will only
allow the appropriate service to perform the update. For example, only the vulnerability
management service will be allowed to perform approved scans and the patch management
service will be allowed to perform the patching.
6.4.3. Challenges
In this subsection, we will highlight potential challenges and limitations of our pro-
posed framework.
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(1) Physical attacks: If the trusted hardware is replaced with a malicious hardware
when the system is offline, any new workloads installed can be compromised. This
would require physical access to the hardware and can be detected or prevented
using physical security measures.
(2) Performance issues: All the new operations added for ensuring trust and security,
will result in non-negligible performance overhead. The actual overhead varies from
workload to workload and the type of measuring services or security architectures
it requires. There is also potential lag created when the system waits for the veri-
fication to be performed using hardware reporting. This can affect the usability of
the system.
(3) Designing applications for security architectures: Designing or modifying applica-
tions to work with security architectures provided by the framework may not be
straight forward. This may complicate the development, deployment, and manage-
ment of the regular operation of the application.
(4) Reliability of the security architectures: When the security architectures are im-
plemented, some of the security benefits are easily discernible. It is important to
understand the security guarantees provided by the security architecture and proper
attention needs to be paid in selecting the appropriate architecture for a specific
workload.
(5) Unknown vulnerabilities: The vulnerability management service can only protect
the workload against known vulnerabilities. A zero day vulnerability in any com-
ponent of the stack, can compromise parts of the trust and security guarantees
provided by the framework. This challenge is common for all security solutions.
(6) Unknown backdoors (Intel ME): Not all the features of the hardware or firmware are
always open and well known. Some of these features can be surprisingly vulnerable
to a determined attacker. It is quite impossible to defend against a hidden feature
that can be leveraged as an undetected backdoor into the system. This problem




In this chapter, we have presented the necessary principles required to build a secure
and trusted execution environment for virtualized workloads. We also provided a reference
architecture detailing all the necessary components and their operations. A thorough analysis
of our framework is provided to understand how to implement the architecture, trust and






The first contribution of our work is Virtualization Based Secure Execution (vBASE)
framework. This framework enables implementation, testing, and executing security archi-
tectures in the virtualization layer. By implementing security architectures in the virtual-
ization layer, vbase can provide confidentiality and integrity for the virtualized workloads.
We have implemented a simple prototype to demonstrate the framework’s abilities. In this
example we have shown that a secure application can directly communicate with the hypervi-
sor bypassing the operating system and protect security sensitive information from powerful
attackers. The prototype example was successful in preventing the overwriting of secure keys
by the Operating System.
The second contribution of our work is Race-free On-demand Integrity Measurement
(Radium) Architecture. This architecture eliminates the TOCTTOU attacks by providing
on-demand measurements. To provide trustworthy integrity measurements on demand, we
have implemented Asynchronous Root of Trust for Measurement (ARTM) by extending
DRTM. ARTM extends the trust in the platform to the hypervisor using DRTM’s verified
launch. By keeping the hypervisor TCB and runtime interactions minimal, we have extended
the trust in the hypervisor beyond the verified launch. By taking advantage of the ARTM,
we designed measuring services that can perform trustworthy on-demand measurements and
advanced security solutions such as a rootkit detector. In our prototype implementation, we
have demonstrated that our platform can perform trustworthy dynamic measurements and
detect stealthy rootkits.
The third contribution of our work is Ontology based vulnerability management which
is powered by an ontology based vulnerability database (OVDB). This database includes
vulnerabilities, exploits, and mitigations. By modeling all these databases using ontologies,
we can connect all related concepts logically without using queriesand demonstrated that
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it is more efficient and intuitive. It also allows use to use logical reasoning and semantic
natural language processing in working with vulnerabilities.
We have further extended our OVDB by implementing an ontology based vulnerabil-
ity assessment for cloud computing (Vulcan) and proven that ontology based vulnerability
management can perform well with complex software stacks such as cloud computing.
Our final contribution is the Secure and Trusted Execution Framework for Virtu-
alized Workloads. This framework provides trust and security guarantees to virtualized
workloads throughout their execution lifecycle. We have provided design principles neces-
sary for ensuring trust and security execution based on our previous works. This framework
can be implemented using modern virtualization hardware and the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM), without the need of expensive custom hardware. Along with the design principles
we have provided detailed analysis on implementation strategies and proven that our frame-
work actually provides trust and security guarantees throughout the execution lifecycle of
virtualized workloads.
7.2. Future Directions
With continued adoption of cloud computing, information services are becoming in-
creasingly distributed in nature. Most of the data and computation is hosted on remote
computers. In this light, it is important to have secure and trustworthy systems. While
large scale formal verification of systems may be difficult in the foreseeable future, it is defi-
nitely possible to build trusted and secure computing systems with a small verified systems-
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